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I. INTRODUCTION
For over two-thirds of a century, federal estate tax law has expressly
provided that property transferred by a decedent during his lifetime will
nonetheless be subject to estate tax if he retains the right to the property's income
for the remainder of his life. I This rule-now embodied in section 2036 of the
Internal Revenue Code2-reflects Congress's belief that such transfers are
inherently testamentary: the transferor continues to enjoy the "transferred"
property for the rest of his life, while his beneficiary obtains the property only
upon the transferor's death. 3
During the same period, "bona fide sale[s] for an adequate and full
consideration" have been excluded from the operation of this provision:' The
rationale for this exclusion is that a transfer of property for which the transferor

1. The first statutory provision expressly mandating this result was § 302(c) of the
Revenue Act of 1926 as amended by the Joint Resolution of March 3, 193 I. H.RJ. Res. 529,
71st Congo (1931). Previously, the Government had argued for the same result under the general
provision requiring inclusion in the decedent's gross estate ofany property he transferred where
the transfer was "intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after his death." This
language was contained in § 202(b) of the Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463,39 Stat. 756, 777-78
(1916), and was carried over in subsequent revenue acts. See, e.g., Revenue Act of 1918, ch.
18, § 402(c), 40 Stat. 1057, 1097 (1919); Revenue Act ofl921, ch. 136, § 402(c), 42 Stat. 227,
278 (1921); Revenue Act of1924, ch. 234, § 302 (c), 43 Stat. 253, 304 (1924); Revenue Act of
1926, ch. 27, § 302(c), 44 Stat. 9,70 (1926). However, the Supreme Court ruled this language
did not encompass a lifetime transfer of property in which the decedent retained a life estate in
May v. Heiner, 281 U.S. 238 (1930), overruled in part by Commissioner v. Estate of Church,
335 U.S. 639 (1949), and in three decisions decided on the same day in 1931: Burnet v.
Northern Trust Co., 283 U.S. 782 (1931); McConnick v. Burnet, 283 U.S. 784 (\93\); and
Morsman v. Burnet, 283 U.S. 783-84 (1931). One day after the 1931 decisions were handed
down, Congress enacted the Joint Resolution of March 3, 1931, legislatively overruling them
and May v. Heiner. For the history ofCongress's response to May v. Heiner, see Commissioner
v. Estate of Church, 335 U.S. at 639-40.
2. Unless otherwise stated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code
of 1986 as currently in effect. Section 2036(a) provides:
The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property to the
extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at any time made
a transfer (except in case ofa bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth), by trust or otherwise, under which he
has retained for his life or for any period not ascertainable without reference
to his death or for any period which does not in fact end before his death(1) the possession or enjoyment of, or the right to the income
from, the property, or
(2) the right, either alone or in conjunction with any person, to
designate the persons who shall possess or enjoy the property or
the income therefrom.
3. See Estate ofChurch v. Commissioner, 335 U.S. 632, 646 (1949) ("[T]rusts reserving life estates with remainders over at grantors' deaths are ... effective substitutes for wills.").
4. IRe § 2036(a) (parenthetical clause).
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receives full value does not diminish the size of his estate, and thus there is no
need to subject the transferred property to estate tax. 5
An issue that has vexed courts, estate planners, and commentators is
how to ascertain the adequacy of consideration when a property owner sells a
remainder interest in the property and retains a life estate. For the exclusion to
apply, must the consideration received for the remainder simply equal the value
of the remainder or must it equal the value of the entire property? A substantial
body of case law-developed largely in the context of the so-called "widow's
election"-holds the consideration must equal the full value of the property.6
However, the Third Circuit in D'Ambrosio in 19967 and the Fifth Circuit in
Wheeler in 19978 held that consideration received in a simple sale of a remainder
is adequate-and hence the exclusion applies-where the consideration merely
equals the actuarial value of the remainder on the date of sale. More recently, the
Ninth Circuit in Magnin, overruling one of its own decisions, adopted the
D 'Ambrosio-Wheeler test for "full consideration."g (This article will sometimes
refer to D'Ambrosio, Wheeler, and Magnin collectively as the "D'Ambrosio
trilogy").
This issue is of more than academic interest. If the holdings of the
D 'Ambrosio trilogy are correct, existing case law regarding the widow's election
(hereinafter "spousal election") is arguably wrong. If so, estate tax planners will
have acquired a valuable tool, albeit one subject to serious income tax risks, that
would apparently enable a couple to pass one-half or more oftheir combined
property to the next generation free ofany gift or estate tax in many cases and
to enjoy significant transfer tax savings in virtually every case. 10

5. In Estate of Frothingham v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 211, 215 (1973), the court
stated:
Thus, where the transferred property is replaced by other property of equal
value received in exchange, there is no reason to impose an estate tax in
respect of the transferred property, for it is reasonable to assume that the
property acquired in exchange will find its way into the decedent's gross
estate at his death unless consumed ... in much the same manner as would
the transferred property itself had the transfer not taken place.
6. See, e.g., Pittman v. United States, 878 F. Supp. 833 (E.D.N.C. 1994); Wheeler
v. United States, 77 AF.T.R.lJIlJI 96-612 to 96-613 (W. D. Tex. 1996), rev'd, 116 F.3d 749 (5th
Cir. 1997); D'Ambrosio v. Commissioner, 105 T.C. 252 (1995), rev'd, 101 F.3d 309 (3d Cir.
1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1230 (1997); Gradow v. United States, 11 Cl. Ct. 808 (1987),
aft'd, 897 F.2d 516 (Fed. Cir. 1990); United States v. Past, 347 F.2d 7 (9th Cir. 1965); Estate
of Gregory v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 1012 (1963).
7. D'Ambrosio v. Commissioner, 101 F.3d 309 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S.
1230 (1997).
8. Wheeler v. United States, 116 F.3d 749 (5th Cir. 1997).
9. Estate of Magnin v. Commissioner, 184 F.3d 1074 (9th Cir. 1999).
10. See infra Part N for a discussion of possible tax advantages of spousal election
wills.
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Part IT of this article traces the evolving judicial interpretation of the
"adequate and full consideration" exclusion found in section 2036. Part ill
examines the proper application of the "adequate and full consideration"
exclusion to simple sales of remainders such as those involved in D'Ambrosio
and Wheeler and concludes that the holdings in those cases are indisputably
correct. It then analyzes the possible planning opportunities these decisions offer,
particularly in light of section 2702.
Part IV examines the effect of the D'Ambrosio trilogy on spousal
elections. This Part outlines the potential gift and estate tax savings this device
affords and then considers how such elections should be analyzed for purposes
of the "adequate and full consideration" exclusion. It concludes that spousal
elections in virtually every case should be governed by the reciprocal trust
doctrine. Under this approach, spousal elections do not constitute sales of
remainders, and hence the holdings of the D'Ambrosio trilogy should not apply.
Indeed, in many cases, the existing position of the Internal Revenue Service and
the courts produces excessively generous results to taxpayers. However, in the
relatively few cases where the reciprocal trust doctrine should not apply, the
current treatment of spousal elections should change to conform to the holdings
in D'Ambrosio, Wheeler, and Magnin.
II. JUDICIALINTERPRETATION OF "ADEQUATE AND FuLL CONSIDERATION"

Spousal elections have played a central role in molding judicial
interpretation of the phrase "adequate and full consideration." These elections
originated in community property states where each spouse possesses a current,
vested one-half interest in all property acquired by the couple during marriage. II
In a spousal election will, the deceased spouse attempts to dispose of both his
share and the surviving spouse's share of the community property. Since the
deceased spouse can only dispose of his share of the community property, state
courts hold that such wills impose an election on the surviving spouse: she must
either allow her share of the community property to pass under the decedent's
will, in which case she receives the benefits provided for her in the will, or else
retain her share of the community property, in which event she forfeits all such
benefits. 12
Following convention-and actuarial experience-this article assumes
that husband H dies first survived by his \vife W. Unless otherwise indicated, the
following facts apply: H's \vill purports to leave all the community property in
trust, with income payable to W for her life and principal payable upon her death

11. See generally Roger A Cunningham et aI., The Law of Property §§ 5.14 -.16 /2d
ed. 1993) (overview of state community property laws).
12. See, e.g., fu re Smith's Estate, 40 P. 1037 (Cal.1895); Graser v. Graser, 215
S.W.2d 867 (Tex. 1948); Dakan v. Dakan, 83 S.W.2d 620 (Tex. 1935).
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to their child C. W chooses to let her share of the community property pass to the
trust created under H's will. For purposes of clarity, the trust that W's share of
the community property passes into will be referred to as W Tn/st, and the trust
that H's property passes into will be referred to as H Trust.
When W elects to allow her share of the community property to pass
under H's will, she in effect "transfers" her property to W Trust. Since she
"retains" a life estate in that trust, the trust will be included in her gross estate
pursuant to section 2036, unless W's election constitutes "a bona fide sale for an
adequate and full consideration."13 The "consideration" W receives for making
the election is seemingly her life estate in H Trust. The question confronting the
courts was how to determine whether this "consideration" was "adequate and
full." Should this consideration (Le., W's life estate in H Trust) be measured
against the full value of her property that passes into W Tn/st or merely the value
of the remainder that W gives C in her share of the property?
In the early cases, the courts apparently found the answer self-evident,
holding without discussion that the value of W's life estate is "adequate"
consideration only if it equals the full value of the property transferred to W
Trust. 14 The courts seemed to have thought along these lines: W has transferred
her entire share of the community property to the testamentary trust established
under H's will; therefore, the consideration received for this transfer is adequate
only if it equals the value of the property transferred. 15 What this approach
overlooks is that while W transferred title to her entire share of the community
property, economically she transferred only a remainder interest since she
continued to enjoy the economic benefit of her retained life estate. 16

13. IRC § 2036(a)(I).
14. United States v. Past, 347 F.2d 7 (9th Cir. 1965) (divorce settlement); Estate of
Gregory v. Commissioner, 39 T.e. 1012 (1963). Some early cases found the consideration
inadequate without specifying the appropriate measure. See, e.g., United States v. Gordon, 406
F.2d 332 (5th Cir. 1969); Estate ofVardell v. Commissioner, 307 F.2d 688 (5th Cir. 1962). In
these cases, the value of W's life estate in H Tmst was less than either the remainder in WTrllst
or the total value of W Trust; hence, there was no need to specify the appropriate yardstick in
determining the adequacy of consideration. Thus in Vardell, the value of W's legal life estate
in H's property was approximately $454,000, less than either the value of remainder in W's
property (approximately $684,000) or the total value of such property (approximately
$1,241,000). Estate of Vardell, 35. T.C. 50, 53 (1960), rev'd on other grounds, 307 F.2d 688
(5th Cir. 1965). This was also true in Gordon, 406 F.2d at 335 (value of W's life interest in H's
share (approximately $18,500) was less than the value of the remainder in her share (about
$34,800) or the total value of her share (about $53,300)).
15. Past, 347 F.2d at 13-14 (wife's life estate worth $143,346 "from her husband's
contribution" was less than the $243,989 "decedent contributed to trust"); Estate of Gregory,
39 T.C. at 1017 (wife's life estate worth $60,635 in portion of trust contributed by husband is
"clearly not adequate and full consideration" for the $65,925 contributed by wife to trust).
16. Cf. Regs. § 25.2512-5(d)(2) ("When the donor transfers property in trust or
otherwise and retains an interest therein, generally, the value of the gift is the value of the
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The courts in these cases permitted W's estate, pursuant to section
2043(a),17 to offset W's gross estate by the consideration she received for making
the election, that is, the value of her life estate in H Trust. 18 The IRS as well as
the courts now uniformly allow this offset. 19 Note, however, that this relief is
severely limited and much less beneficial than the "adequate and full
consideration" exclusion. When the exclusion applies, W Trust is completely
eliminated from W's gross estate. In contrast, the section 2043(a) offset merely
reduces W's gross estate by the value of her life estate in H Trust leaving the
balance of W Trust taxable. Moreover, the courts have limited the amount of the
offset to the value of W's life estate as of the election date.:o Thus, while the
amount included in W's gross estate under section 2036(a) will increase to reflect
any appreciation in the value of W Trust occurring between w's election and her
death, the offset under section 2043(a) remains fixed.:!1

property transferred less the value of the donor's retained interest."): Regs. § 25.2702-11b)
("The amount of the gift. if any, is then determined by subtracting the value of the interests
retained by the transferor or any applicable family member from the value of the transferred
property.").
17. Section 2043(a) provides:
If anyone of the transfers, trusts, interests, rights, or powers enumerated
and described in sections 2035 to 2038, inclusive, and section 2Ml is
made, created, exercised. or relinquished for a consideration in money or
money's worth, but is not a bona fide sale for an adequate and full
consideration in money or money's worth, there shall be included in the
gross estate only the excess of the fair market value at the time of death of
the property othenvise to be included on account of such transaction, ovcr
the value of the consideration received therefor by the decedent.
18. See, e.g., Past, 347 F.2d at 14: Estate of Vardell, 307 F.2d at 693: Estate of
Gregory, 39 T.C. at 1019-20.
19. In litigation involving spousal elections, the IRS has conceded that the survi\ing
spouse's estate is entitled to a § 2043 offset equal to the value of the lifc estatc she rcceivcd in
the deceased spouse's property valued on the date of its receipt. Sec, e.g., Gradow v. United
States, 11 Cl. Ct. 808, 809-10 (1987), aff'd, 897 F.2d 516 (Fed. Cir. 1990): Estate ofGregory,
39 T.C. at 1020 (lRS conceded issue on brief). The IRS also allows a § 2M3 offset in simple
sale-of-remainder cases equal to the amount of consideration the decedent rcceivcd valued on
the date of the sale. See, e.g., Wheeler v. United States, 116 F.3d 749, 753 (5th Cir. 1997):
D'Ambrosiov. Commissioner, 101 F.3d 309, 311 & n.1 (3d Cir. 1996), cen. denied, 117 S. Ct.
1822 (1997).
20. See, e.g., Estate of Magnin v. Commissioner, 184 F.3d 1074, 1082 (1999): United
States v. Righter, 400 F.2d 344 (8th Cir. 1968): Estate of Gregory, 39 T.C. at 1021 (for
purposes of § 2043(a), "relevant value of her life estate in [husband's] propeny was the value
at the time of transfer"); Regs. § 20.2043-1.
21. Conversely, the § 2043(a) offset is not reduced when the value of the transferrcd
property decreases in value between the date of transfer and the transferor's death.
The propriety of freezing the § 2M3(a) offset at the consideration's value on the date
of its receipt is challenged in Charles L B. Lowndes, Consideration and the Federal Estate and
Gift Taxes: Transfers for Panial Consideration, Relinquishment of Marital Rights, Family
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The courts in the early cases may have failed to thorougWy analyze
whether the consideration received was to be measured against the value of the
remainder interest or the value of the fee in the transferred property because the
facts in those cases showed the consideration was inadequate regardless of which
measure was used. 22 This was not true in Gradow,23 where the Court of Claims
for the purpose of deciding a motion for summary judgment assumed that the
value of W's life estate in H Trust exceeded the value of the remainder interest

Annuities, the Widow's Election, and Reciprocal Trusts, 35 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 50, 56-60
(1966). Professor Lowndes advocates a "proportional rule" under which the § 2043(a) offset
would equal the transferred property's date-of-death value multiplied by a fraction, the
numerator of which is the consideration received and the denominator of which is the value of
the property, with both the consideration and the property being valued on the date of transfer.
See id.; see also Dodge et al., 50-5th T.M., Transfers with Retained Interests and Powers, at A86 to A-87 (1992) (each endorsing proportional approach) and Keith E. Morrison, The Widow's
Election: The Issue of Consideration, 44 Tex. L. Rev. 223, 242-44 (1965). Judge Learned
Hand's decision in Helvering v. United States Trust Co., 111 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1940) appears
to be the only judicial endorsement of this approach. The Tax Court rebuffed the taxpayer's
attempt to use a proportional approach in Estate of Magnin v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. Memo
(CCH) 1856,69 T.C. Memo (RIA) lJI 96,025 at 248 (1996); aff d, 184 F.3d 1074 (9th Cir. 1999),
stating "it is well settled that the consideration received is to be valued at the time of the
transfer."
22. In Estate of Gregory v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 1012 (1963), W's life estate in H
Trust was worth only $12,000, while the total value of the property Wallowed to pass into W
Trust was $66,000, and the remainder interest in WTrust was $53,000. See id. at 1017. Thus,
the consideration received (Le., W's life estate in H Trust) was inadequate whether measured
against the full amount ofproperty Wallowed to pass into WTrust or the remainder interest in
that trust. (The value of remainder was determined by taking the factor for determining W's life
estate, 0.1967, see id. at lOIS, determining its reciprocal, 0.8033, and multiplying the reciprocal
by the value ofthe amount Wcontributed to WTrust, $66,000, see id. at 1017. All figures in this
footnote are rounded to the nearest $1,000.)
Under the figures used by the majority in United States v. Past, 347 F.2d 7 (9th Cir.
1965), the test employed to determine adequacy of consideration would make a difference.
Under its figures, W's life estate in H's contribution, $143,000, see id. at 14 n.7, was greater
than the value of the remainder interest in the property she contributed, $101,000 (Le.,
contribution of $244,000 less her life estate therein, $143,000), but less than the full amount
of her property contribution, $244,000, see id. at 14. However, as Judge Ely pointed out in
dissent, the majority overvalued H's contribution to the trust. Since H's total interest in the
community was worth $401,000, and since he received $294,000 outright in the settlement, his
maximum contribution to the trust was $107,000 ($401,000 - $294,000), making W's
contribution $380,000. See id. at 16. Using these figures and the Government's actuarial tables,
Judge Ely computed the value of W's life estate in H's contribution at $63,000 and the
remainder interest in W's contribution at $157,000. See id. at 17 n.2. Thus, the consideration
W received (i.e., her life estate in H's contribution, having a value of $63,000) was inadequate
whether measured against W's contribution to the trust ($380,000) or the value ofthe remainder
in her contribution ($157,000).
23. Gradow v. United States, 11 Cl. Ct. 808 (1987), affd, 897 F.2d 516 (Fed Cir.
1990).
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in W Trust but was less than the value of the fee interest in that trust. 24 Despite
this factual difference, the court reiterated the holding of the prior cases that
consideration in a spousal election is adequate only if the life estate W receives
in H Trust equals or exceeds the value of the entire property placed in W Tn/st. 25
The Gradow court offered two justifications for its holding, one based
on the statute's language and the other on its policy. The court referred to the
introductory language of section 2036(a): 'The gross estate shall include ... all
property ... of which decedent has at any time made a transfer." It then asserted
that "[f]undamental principles of grammar dictate that the parenthetical
expression which then follows-'(except in the case of a bona fide
sale ...)'-refers to a transfer of the same property, i.e., the one-half of the
community property she placed into trust."u In other words, the requirement of
"adequate and full consideration," which is found in the parenthetical expression,
refers back to "all property" transferred by the decedent. Hence, adequacy of
consideration must be measured by the full value of W's property that she
allowed to pass under H's will.
The court also noted that the justification for the "adequate and full
consideration" exemption found in section 2036 (and the other retained interest
provisions) is that the amount included in a transferor's gross estate is not
diminished by a transfer for which the transferor receives full compensation and
hence no need exists to add the transferred property back into his gross estate.rJ
In light of this rationale, the court held that the exception requires "at a
minimum, [that] the sale accomplish an equilibrium for estate tax purposes,"28
that is, that the consideration received fully replenish the amount removed from
the estate by the transfer. The court asserted this purpose would be frustrated if
the consideration received were deemed adequate so long as it merely equaled the
actuarial value of the remainder. If that were so, the court insisted, "the exception
[for a bona fide sale] would swallow the rule. A young person could sell a

24. Id. at 809-10. The coun granted Govcrnmcnt's motion for partial summary
judgment where parties stipulated that W's Iifc estatc in H's propcrt), was worth less than her
share of the community, even though ta.xpayer asserted that thc valuc of such lifc estate
exceeded the value of the remainder she gave up in her share. See id.
25. The coun first found that the formula statcd in the prior cascs-that adcquac), of
the consideration Wreceived (i.e., W's life estate in H Tmst) should be measurcd against thc
total value of the property she allowed to pass into W Tmst-would havc becn followcd by the
courts in those cases even ifsuch consideration had cxceeded the valuc of the remaindcr Wgave
up in WTrust. See id. at 811 & n.3. It then concluded that this approach was corrcct. See id. at
813.
26. Id. at 813.
27. See id. at 813-14.
28. Id. at 814.
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remainder for a fraction of the property's worth, enjoy the property for life, and
then pass it along without estate or gift tax consequences.,,29
The taxpayer countered that where a remainder is sold for its current
actuarial value, the amount received, when invested and compounded at the rate
used in the Government's tables in valuing that remainder, would grow over the
transferor's life expectancy to the property's value as ofthe date of the transfer. 30
Hence, the transfer of the remainder would cause no reduction in the transferor's
gross estate, and the purpose of the "adequate and full consideration" exception
would be fully satisfied. But the court rejected this contention, stating that:
The fond hope that a surviving spouse would take pains to
invest, compound, and preserve inviolate all life income from
half of a trust, knowing that it would thereupon be taxed
without his or her having received any lifetime benefit, is a slim
basis for putting a different construction on § 2036(a) than the
one heretofore consistently adopted. 31
At the same time the courts were applying this rule in the estate tax
context, they were applying the opposite rule in gift tax cases. Section 2512(b)
provides that a taxable gift occurs only to the extent that "the value of the
property [transferred] exceed[s] the value of the consideration" received. 32 Thus
no taxable gift takes place if a transferor receives "adequate and full
consideration." In contradistinction to their rulings in estate tax cases, the courts
held that consideration in a spousal election is "adequate and full" for gift tax
purposes if the consideration merely equals the value of the remainder. 33 Thus,
W makes no taxable gift by allowing her property to pass under H's will, so long
as the value of the life estate she receives in H Trust equals or exceeds the value
of the remainder she gives to C in W Trust. 34 The IRS acquiesced in these
holdings in 1964.35 When confronted with this discrepancy, the courts could do

29. Id. at 815.

30. See id.
31. Id. at 816.
32. IRC § 2512(b).
33. Tunnan v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 1123 (1961), acq., 1964-2 C.B. 7. See also
Siegel v. Commissioner, 26 T.e. 743 (1956), acq., 1964-2 C.B. 7, aff'd, 250 F.2d 339 (9th Cir.
1957).
34. Even where there is a taxable gift, the amount of the gift is limited to the amount
by which C's remainder in W Trust exceeds W's life estate in H Trust. Put differently, W's gift
of a remainder in her property to C is offset by the value of the life estate she receives in H
Trust. Siegel v. Commissioner, 26 T.e. 743 (1956), acq., 1964-2 C.B. 7, aff'd, 250 F.2d 339
(9th Cir. 1957).
35. See 1964-2 C.B. 7 (acquiescing to the holdings in Tunnan v. Commissioner, 35
T.C. 1123 (1961) and Siegel v. Commissioner, 26T.C. 743 (1956), aff'd, 250 F.2d 339 (9th Cir.
1957».
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little more than respond that one case involved the gift tax while the other
involved the estate tax. 36
All the foregoing cases involved spousal elections. Prior to Gradow, no
court had held that the amount received in a simple sale of a remainder-as
contrasted with a spousal election-must equal the value of the underlying fee
to constitute "adequate and full consideration." Indeed, the Service had ruled
privately that the consideration received by a fee owner who simply sells a
remainder interest in his property is adequate if it merely equals the actuarial
value of the remainder as determined under the Government's tables. 37 But after
Gradow, the Service started issuing rulings holding that consideration in a sale
of a remainder is inadequate unless it equals the full value of the underlying fee. 33
The Tax Collff9 and a number of Federal District courts.w followed suit and
endorsed the Government's new position. It was these rulings that the Courts of
Appeal in the Third and Fifth Circuits firmly rejected in D'Ambrosi041 and
Wheeler. 42
The court in D'Ambrosio disputed the contention of the Gradow court
that, "fundamental principles of grammar dictate" that the phrase "adequate and
full consideration" as used in section 2036 must be read as applying to the entire
"property" transferred by the decedent. 43 The D 'Ambrosio court asserted that the
Gradow court had ignored the words following "property" in section 2036;
specifically, it had failed to note that the actual language used in the statute was
"all property to the extem ofany interest therein" transferred by the decedent.44
The D'Ambrosio court concluded that the phrase "adequate and full
consideration" refers back to the "interest" the decedent transferred, not to the

36. See Gradowv. United States, 11 CI. Ct. 808, 816n.12(1987), affd. 897 F.2d 516
(Fed. Cir. 1990)-an estate tax case involving a spousal election-where the court stated. "as
legal support, [taxpayer] points to Commissioner I'. Siegel. 250 F.2d 339 (9tll Cir. 1957). Siegel
was a gift tax case, however. and was distinguished later on that basis by the same court in
[United States v.] Past, 347 F.2d [7] at 13 n.4 [9tll Cir. 1965]:'
37. See Tech. Adv. Mem. 78-06-001 (Oct. 31. 1977); Tech. Adv. Mem. 81-45-012
(July 20, 1981).
38. See Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-33-001 (Jan. 31, 1990).
39. See D'Ambrosio v. Commissioner. 105 T.C. 252 (1995), rev'd, 10I F.3d 309 (3d
Cir. 1996). cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1230 (1997).
40. See Pittman v. United States, 878 F. Supp. 833 (E.D.N.C. 1994I; Parker v. United
States, 894 F.Supp. 445, 447 (N.D. Ga. 1995) (expressing "reservations about correctness of
Gradow"); Wheelerv. United States, 77 AF.T.R. 2d (RIA) 1045 (W. D. Tex. 1995), rev'd, 116
F.3d 749 (5th Cir. 1997).
41. D'Ambrosio v. Commissioner. 101 F.3d 309 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520
U.S. 1230 (1997).
42. Wheeler v. United States, 116 F.3d 749 (5th Cir. 1997).
43. D'Ambrosio, 101 F.3d at 314-15.
44. lei. at 314. See IRe § 2036(a).
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"property" of which such "interest" is a part. Hence, consideration is adequate
if it merely equals the value of the "interest" transferred, that is, the remainder.45
The opinions in both D'Ambrosio and Wheeler agreed with Gradow that
the "adequate and full consideration" exception should apply only where the
consideration received was sufficient to fully replenish the depletion in the
transferor's estate caused by the transfer. 46 However, they rejected the Gradow
court's concern that a transferor's gross estate would not be fully replenished
where the consideration was limited to the actuarial value of the remainder. They
pointed out that if such consideration is invested at the yield used in the
Government's tables to compute the present value of the remainder, it will grow
over the life of the transferor (if he lives his full life expectancy) to the date-oftransfer value of the underlying fee. Hence there will be no diminishment in the
transferor's gross estate. 47 Indeed, there will be an excessive inclusion of value
in the transferor's gross estate under the Gradow approach for then his gross
estate will include both the date-of-death value of the underlying fee and the
consideration received for the transferred remainder plus all the income that
accumulated on such consideration.48
Moreover, the court in D 'Ambrosio dismissed the concern expressed in
Gradow that the transferor might consume all or part of the consideration
received, or the income earned thereon, so that there would not be a full
restoration of value in the transferor's gross estate. The court first noted that the
"[t]ax law ... imposes no burdens on how a person spends her money.,,49 It
acknowledged that if the income from W's retained life estate were inadequate to
support her, she would have to "invade the consideration she received in
exchange for her remainder.,,50 But it argued that the amount ofthis invasion, and
hence the depletion in her gross estate, would be "to no different an extent than
[if] ... she retained the fee simple interest.,,51
The impact of D'Ambrosio and Wheeler on spousal election cases is
unclear. The court in D'Ambrosio made no distinction between a simple sale of
a remainder and a spousal election, and appears to have simply found
Gradow-a spousal election case-wrongly decided.52 The Wheeler opinion is
more circumspect, stating it found the Third Circuit's rejection of Gradow

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
5!.
52.

D'Ambrosio, 101 F.3d at 315.
Id. at 312-13; Wheeler v. United States, 116 F.3d 749,761-62 (5th Cir. 1997).
See D'Ambrosio, 101 F.3d at 316-17; Wheeler, 116 F.3d at 762.
See D'Ambrosio, 101 F.3d at 316.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.

HeinOnline -- 4 Fla. Tax Rev. 548 1998-2001

1999]

Estate and Git Tax Effects ofSellillg a Remaillder

549

"persuasive" but adding it saw "little utility in revisiting the federal estate tax
ramifications of the widow's election device . . . ."53
The Ninth Circuit's recent decision in Magnin, however, bears directly
on spousal elections, since the exchange in that case is analytically indistinguishable from what occurs in a spousal election. In a spousal election. Wexchanges
a remainder in her property for a life estate in H's property. In Magnin. a son exchanged a remainder in his property for voting control and a life income interest
in his father's property.54 The transaction in Magnin was therefore quite different
from the simple sales of remainders in D'Ambrosio and Wheeler. Unfortunately.
the Magnin court followed D'Ambrosio and Wheeler without considering
whether these differences compelled a different analysis. I believe they do. and
in Part IV, I develop that analysis and apply it to the facts of Magnin.

m. WHAT IS "ADEQUATE AND FuLL CONSIDERATION"
IN A SIMPLE SALE OF A REMAINDER?

A Critique ofthe Gradow and the D' Ambrosio-Wheeler Views of "Adequate
and Full Consideration"

In Gradow, the court found the phrase "adequate and full consideration"
referred back and thus applied to the "property" transferred by the decedent,s5
while the court in D 'Ambrosio found the phrase referred back and applied to the
"interest therein" (i.e., the remainder) transferred by the decedent. 56 In fact, it is
unlikely that the draftsperson intended "adequate and full consideration" to
modify either the words "property" or the "interest therein" transferred by the
decedent. In the original 1931 formulation of section 2036. the draftsperson
tagged the exception for "a bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration"
on at the end of a long subsection dealing with both gifts in contemplation of
death and transfers \vith retained life estates. 51 The language regarding the

53. Wheeler v. United States, 116 F.3d 749, 757 n.7(5th Cir. 1997). The court also
noted that "the widow election cases present factually distinct circumstances that preclude the
wholesale importation of GradoII',s rationale into the present case." Id. at 756.
54. See Estate of Magnin v. Commissioner, 184 F.3d 1074, 1075 (9th Cir. 1999).
55. Gradow v. United States, 11 Cl. Ct. 808,813 (1987), affd, 897 F.2d 516 (Fed
Cir.1990).
56. D'Ambrosio. 101 F.3d at 314-15 (3d Cir. 1996).
57. The 1931 predecessor to § 2036(a) read as follows:
The value of the gross estate of the decedent shall be determined by
including the value at the time ofhis death of all property, real or personal,
tangible or intangible, wherever situated(c) To the extent of any illterest thereill of which the decedent has at any
time made a transfer, by trust or otherwise, in contemplation of or intended
to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after his death, including a
transfer under which the transferor has retained for his life or any period not
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"adequate and full consideration" exception was placed so far away from the
terms "property" and "interest therein" that it is highly unlikely that the drafter
expected or intended the reader to read the latter phrase as modifying the earlier
ones. Indeed, the language relating to "adequate and full consideration" was
separated from the rest of the subsection by a semi-colon. The meaning of the
exception must therefore be found in the words of the exception itself; not by
tying the words of the exception to words found in remote portions of the section.
What the language of the exclusion requires is that there be a "bona sale
for an adequate and full consideration." When is there a "bona fide sale for an
adequate and full consideration"? Surely this contemplates a transfer in which the
buyer pays fair value (or what she believes is fair value) for what she gets, and
the seller receives fair value (or what she believes is fair value) for what she
gives up. What the buyer "gets" and the seller "gives up" in a sale of a remainder
is the remainder itself-not the underlying fee-and thus adequacy of
consideration should be determined solely with reference to the remainder. It is
implausible that Congress intended the words "a bona fide sale for an adequate
and full consideration" to impose a requirement that the buyer pay substantially
in excess of fair value for what she is buying. Indeed, as several commentators
have pointed out, if the buyer were to pay the full value of the underlying
property when she acquires only a remainder, the buyer-under established gift
tax principles-will normally be making a gift to the seller of the amount by
which the value of the fee exceeds the value of the remainder. 58 The Gradow
construction has the strange result of almost always limiting the "bona fide sale"
exception to cases of gifts. 59

ending before his death (1) the possession or enjoyment of, or the income
from, the property or (2) the right to designate the persons who shall
possess or enjoy the property or the income therefrom; except in the case of

a bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in money or
money's worth.
Revenue Act of 1926, § 302(c), ch. 27, 44 Stat. 9, 70 as amended by H.R.J. Res., 71st Cong.,
3d Sess., 46 Stat. 1516 (1931) (emphases added).
58. See Martha W. Jordan, Sales of Remainder Interests: Reconciling Gradow v.
United States and Section 2702, 14 Va. Tax Rev. 671, 682-83 (1995); Steven A. Horowitz,
Economic Reality in Estate Planning: The Case for Remainder Interest Sales, 73 Taxes 386, 388
(1995).
59. Theoretically, the buyer could avoid gift tax treatment if he could show that his
purchase was "made in the ordinary course of business (a transaction which is bona fide, at
arm's length, and free from any donative intent)" since the Regulations deem such purchases
to be made for "adequate and full consideration." Regs. § 25.2512-8 (as amended in 1992).
However, since the purchase price for the remainder would be grossly excessive and since such
purchases are almost always between family members, a buyer in this situation would find it
difficult to establish that his purchase was at arm's length and free from donative intent.
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Moreover, Congress when it created the exception for "bona fide sale[s)
for an adequate and full consideration" clearly intended it to apply to at least
some sales where the seller retains a life interest, or put differently, where the
seller sells a remainder. Otherwise, the exception would never apply. But no
rational, good faith buyer ever buys a remainder for the full value of the
underlying fee. The Gradow construction of the exception renders it meaningless
surplusage.
The approach of the D 'Ambrosio and Wheeler courts also better carries
out the purpose of the "adequate and full consideration" exception, which is to
exempt from transfer tax those transfers which do not reduce the transferor's
gross estate. When the seller of a remainder receives consideration equal to the
remainder's actuarial value, that amount, when invested and compounded at the
rate of return used in the Government's actuarial tables, will grow over the
transferor's life (provided he lives his life expectancy) to an amount equal to the
value of the underlying fee as of the date of the transfer. 6lJ Thus, the transferor's
gross estate will be no less than it would have been if the remainder had not been
sold (assuming no change in the underlying property's value).61

60. For example, assume that A who has a five year life expectancy sells a remainder
in her property Blackacre (fair market value: $500.000) at a time when the interest rate used
for valuing remainders is 6%. The actuarial value of the remainder based on the Government
tables on the date of sale is $373,629. See Internal Revenue Service, Actuarial Values. Alpha
Volume (Publication 1457) 3-10 (1989) [hereinafter Actuarial Values) (remainder factor for a
5 year term at 6% compounded annually is 0.747258; 0.747258 x $500.000 = S373.629). If A
sells the remainder for this amount, reinvests the proceeds at 6Q; interest compounded annually
and lives exactly her life expectancy of five years. the accumulated value of the invested
proceeds will be $500,000 on the date of her death. Thus. there will be no depletion in her
estate.
Year
1

2
3
4

5

Amount at Year-Beginning + Income during Year @ 6Q; = Amount at Year-End
$373,629
$22,418
S396.Q..l7
396,047
23.763
419.810
419,810
25.189
444.999
444,999
471.699
26.700
471,699
28.302
500.001"'

Note, however, that if A uses any part of the sale proceeds or even some of the income
therefrom to finance consumption in excess of what she was pre\iously consuming. the size of
her gross estate will be reduced.
*The one dollar discrepancy is due to rounding; all numbers are rounded to the nearest
dollar. All computations in this article were made on a Hewlett-Packard HP-12C Programmable
Financial Calculator.
61. The approach advocated in the text is fully consistent with United States \'. Allen.
293 F.2d 916 (10th eir. 1961), cerl. denied, 368 U.S. 944 (1961). In that case. Mrs. Allen sold
her retained life estate in a trust she had created to her son for an amount slightly in excess of
its actuarial value. The trial court found that her transfer of her life estate was made in
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Of course, in some cases, the transferor will die prematurely, in which
case his gross estate will be not be fully replenished by reinvestment of the sale
proceeds, while in others the transferor will outlive his life expectancy, in which
event the amount of the reinvested proceeds should exceed that value of the
underlying fee on the date ofthe sale. Likewise, in some cases, the return realized
by the seller of the remainder will be greater than that assumed in the Government's tables while in other cases it will be less. But as the Supreme Court
recognized in another context, "the United States is in business with enough
different taxpayers so that the law of averages has ample opportunity to work.,,62
Moreover, the Gradowconstruction of"adequate and full consideration"
results in an excessive inclusion of value when a fee owner sells a remainder for
its actuarial value, since then the seller's gross estate will include not only the
underlying fee at its date-of-death value, but also the consideration received for
the sale of the remainder together with all income that has accumulated on that
consideration.
Assume that A, who has a five-year life expectancy, sells a remainder
interest in Blackacre (which has a current fee value of $500,000) to B at a time
when the interest rate used for valuing remainders is 6%, reserving a life estate
to herself. If A sells the remainder for its actuarial value of $373,62963 rather
than its fee value of$500,000, Blackacre will, according to Gradow, be included
inA's gross estate at its date-of-death value, i.e., $500,000 if Blackacre does not
change value. However, A's gross estate will also include the consideration A
received for the remainder and the income that accumulates on it. If A reinvests
her sale proceeds of $373,629 at 6% interest compounded annually and lives
exactly her life expectancy of five years, the proceeds will grow to $500,000 by

"contemplation of death." Consequently, the trust principal was includible in her gross estate
under § 2035 as then in effect unless the sale was for an "adequate and full consideration." Id.
at 917. On appeal, the majority opinion held that the consideration was inadequate, since the
purpose of the statute was to include in the gross estate the same amount that would have been
ifno transfer had occurred. Id. at 917-18. If Mrs. Allen had retained her life estate until death.
the full date-of-death value of the trust principal would have been included in her gross estate
pursuant to § 2036. Obviously, the consideration Mrs. Allen received for her life estate did not
replenish her estate for the amount that had been removed from it (i.e., the value of the trust
principal); indeed, it only reimbursed her for the income she otherwise would have received
from her life estate. Full replenishment could be accomplished only by including the trust
principal at its date-of-death value. In contrast, where a remainder is sold for its actuarial value.
the amount included in the seller's gross estate will equal the value of the entire property at the
time of transfer if she lives her full life expectancy and invests the sale proceeds. See supra note
60. Hence the equilibrium sought by the court in Allen will be achieved. Paul R. McDaniel et
al., Federal Wealth Transfer Taxation 304 (4th ed. 1999). See also discussion of this issue in
Wheeler v. United States, 116 F.3d 749,759-61 (5th Cir. 1997).
62. Northeastern Pa. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 387 U.S. 213, 224
(1967) (quoting Gelb v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 544, 551-52 (2d Cir. 1962».
63. See supra note 60.

HeinOnline -- 4 Fla. Tax Rev. 552 1998-2001

1999J

Estate and Git Tax Effects ofSelling a Remainder

553

the time of her death. 64 The estate will be entitled to an offset under section
2043(a) for the consideration A received for the sale of the remainder, that is,
$373,629.65 Thus, the Gradowapproach causes $626,371 to be included inA's
gross estate when A sells the remainder [$500,000 + $500,000 - $373,629], as
contrasted with only $500,000 when A retains the fee. 66 A's gross estate has been
substantially increased-not simply replenished-as a result of the sale. Use of
the Gradow approach frustrates the very "equilibrium for estate tax purposes"
which that court sought to achieve. 67
The Gradow court rejected these arguments because of its skepticism
that the seller of the remainder would "take pains to invest [the sale proceeds],
compound [them], and preserve inviolate all life income" from the reinvested
proceeds. 68 If, as the court feared, the seller consumes just some ofthe income
earned on the sale proceeds, those proceeds will not grow back over the seller's
life expectancy to the property's date-of-sale value. 69
A frequent response to this argument is that there will be no reduction
in the seller's gross estate even if he consumes some of the proceeds (or the
income thereon), since use of the proceeds for consumption "frees up" other
property that the seller would have othenvise used to pay for his consumption.
Thus, the sale proceeds (and accumulations thereon) either directly or indirectly
will find their way into the seller's gross estate. 70
This argument does not give the Gradow court its just due, since it
"fondly" assumes the seller's level ofconsumption is unaffected by his sale ofthe
remainder. 71 This is by no means certain. A sale of a remainder increases the

64. See supra note 60.
65. See supra notes 17-21 and accompanying text.
66. In either case (that is, whether A sells the remainder in B1ackacre or not). A 's
gross estate will also include any income A receives from B1ackacre that remains unconsumed
at A's death.
67. Gradow v. Commissioner. II Cl. Ct. 808. 813-14. aff'd. 897 F.2d 516 (Fed Cir.
1990).
68. leI. at 816.
69. See supra note 60 (providing example). A's estate in that example \\ill be fully
restored to its pre-sale size (i.e.• $500.000). only if both the proceeds from the sale of the
remainder, $373,629, and the income thereon are kept intact and reinvested at 6% compounded
annually.
70. See, e.g., Jordan, supra note 58. at 695-96.
71. The size ofthe seller's gross estate will be unaffected where he maintains his presale level ofconsumption, even ifhe consumes part of the sale proceeds or the income thereon.
Consider the case of C, a person who owns a single asset that yields insufficient income to pay
for his current level ofconsumption. If C sells a remainder interest in the property and maintains
his pre-existing level ofconsumption. he \vill no doubt consume part or all of the sale proceeds
and/or the income thereon. This will reduce the size of his gross estate. but the size of the
reduction will be no greater than if he had retained the fee interest in the property. In the latter
case, C would have needed to "invade the principal" of his property (for example. by selling a
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seller's income, and people tend to increase their consumption as their income
increases. 72 After selling a remainder, the seller will receive not only income from
the underlying property, as he did before the sale, but also income on the
reinvested proceeds. (Note that this increased income will not increase the size
of the seller's gross estate, since the increased income is needed just to restore his
gross estate to its presale size.) Although people may be inhibited from "dipping
into principal," this inhibition probably does not extend to the income earned on
the proceeds from a sale of principal. Indeed, many people sell principal, like
nonincome producing property, just so they can consume the income that the
reinvested proceeds produce. If the sale of a remainder causes the seller to
consume more, his gross estate will be reduced. 73
The correct response to this concern is that it is irrelevant whether the
seller consumes part or even all of the consideration he receives (or any of the
income thereon). No gift occurs where a person sells his property for "adequate
and full consideration." The theory is that the sale has not diminished the seller's
gross estate, and hence there is no need to impose a gift tax to protect the
integrity of the estate tax. This result is not changed by the possibility that the

partial interest in it or by mortgaging it) to maintain his existing level of consumption, and this
would have reduced his gross estate by the same amount as occurred when he sold the remainder
interest. See D'Ambrosio v. Commissioner, 101 F.3d 309, 316 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520
U.S. 1230 (1997).
The weakness in this analysis is the dubious assumption that C's consumption would
remain the same regardless of whether he sold the remainder. If he did not sel1 the remainder,
C, given the "traditional reluctance to 'dip into principal,''' would probably at some point have
curtailed his expenditures to prevent further erosion ofhis dwindling principal. See Stanley M.
Johanson, Revocable Trusts, Widow's Election Wills, and Community Property: The Tax
Problems, 47 Tex. L. Rev. 1247, 1287 (1969).
72. See Johanson, supra note 71, at 1287-88. Professor Johanson writes that where
there is an increase in overall income, "it is likely that Parkinson's Second Law would come into
play: 'Expenditure rises to meet income.' Items that might have been regarded as luxuries at a
lower income level would now become 'necessities.''' Id. at 1288 (footnote omitted).
73. Note that a surviving spouse may also adjust her level of consumption as a result
ofher spousal election. IfW retains her share ofthe community andforgoes life income interest
in H TrllSt: Marriage effects savings by reducing the duplication of fixed expenses that two
people incur when living apart (e.g., lodging and utilities), but these savings disappear when
the marriage ends. If W continues to live in the same lodging as she did before H's death, she
must pay from her income alone the rent, mortgage interest expense, real estate taxes, etc., that
were paid from W's and H's joint income when H was alive. Theoretical1y, W could make up
for this shortfal1 by invading her principal, but "[g]iven widows' traditional reluctance to 'dip
into principal'-particularly when ... principal would be consumed at a fairly rapid rate,
... she would likely adjust her living scale accordingly." Johanson, supra note 71, at 1287. If
Wallows her property to pass under H's will thereby receiving a life income interest in both H
TrllSt and WTrllSt: The amount ofincome available for W's consumption may increase fol1owing
H's death (H's expenses having ceased), and in this case "it is likely that Parkinson's Second
Law would come into play: 'Expenditure rises to meet income.''' Id. at 1288.
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seller may (or in fact does) consume the proceeds, even though this means that
his gross estate will be less than it would be if he had retained the property until
his death. A taxpayer is always free to "beat" the estate tax through consumption
or dissipation ofhis assets. Likewise, the possibility that the seller of a remainder
may consume the proceeds, unproductively invest them, or let them lie fallow
should not disqualify the proceeds as "full and adequate consideration.,,74
Some might argue that section 2036 should still apply because every
transfer of a remainder is potentially testamentary, even when effected by a sale.
Section 2036 treats a gratuitous transfer of a remainder, coupled with a retained
life estate, as a testamentary substitute. This is because the decedent continues
to enjoy the property throughout his life, just as if he had retained ownership of
the fee, and the remainderman comes into possession of the property only upon
the decedent's death, just as if the decedent had kept the fee and devised it to him
at death. Furthermore, the remainderman realizes a net economic benefit upon the
transferor's death, just as if the decedent had left him a bequest or devise.
The first two of these factors will also be present where the fee owner
sells a remainder interest for its actuarial value. Unlike the case of a person who
sells his property in fee simple absolute and thereby terminates his interest in the
property, a fee owner who sells a remainder continues to enjoy the underlying
property for the rest of his life, while the buyer takes possession of the property
only upon the seller's death. If, in addition, the buyer realizes a net economic
benefit from his receipt of the property at the seller's death (after taking into
account his payment of consideration), all the reasons for treating the transfer of
the remainder as testamentary may arguably be said to exist. The case for
applying section 2036 would be particularly strong where the seller had donative
feelings for the buyer (e.g., where the buyer was a natural object of his bounty).75
Note, however, that where the seller lives out her life expectancy and the
remainderman buys the remainder for its actuarial value, the remainderman

74. Wheeler v. United States, 116 F.3d 749, 762-63 (5th Cir. 1997).
75. This analysis may underlie Professor Jordan's assertion that § 2036 should apply
in a "non-arm's length" sale of a remainder even if the seller receives "adequate and full
consideration":
Willie it may be the case that the consideration received in a non-arm's
length transfer is sufficient to prevent depletion of the ta.'tpayer's gross
estate, the donative character of the transaction combined with the
taxpayer's retention of an interest in the property is nevertheless sufficient
to make the transfer testamentary in nature. Therefore, the most appropriate
result is to include the property in the taxpayer's gross estate.
Jordan, supra note 58, at 717-18. Professor Jordan does not explain how she would resolve in
the case of a "non-arm's length transaction" the problem of over-inclusion of value that results
when the "seller's" gross estate includes both the consideration received for the remainder and
the underlying property itself, although she recognizes the problem where the seller and the
remainderman are unrelated. Id. at 689-92.
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derives no economic benefit upon the seller's death unless the property has
appreciated. The net economic benefit a remainderman realizes upon the seller's
death is the date-of-death value of the property less (1) the consideration he paid
for the remainder, and less (2) the income thereon which he has forgone by
paying that consideration to the seller. Under the Government's actuarial tables,
the total amount of these subtractions will exactly equal the fee value of the
property where the property does not appreciate. Consider A in the above
example who sold a remainder in Blackacre to B for its actuarial value of
$373,629 while she retained a life estate for herself. Since B has foregone the
additional $126,371 he could have earned on the $373,629 he paid A during the
five years that she survived,76 the total economic cost to B of the purchase is
$500,000. His receipt of Blackacre at A's death, assuming it is still worth
$500,000, is economically a "wash." Obviously, section 2036 should not apply
where the decedent confers no benefit on her supposed beneficiary.
On the other hand, if Blackacre appreciates, B will realize a net
economic gain upon A's death. 77 Here A's sale of the remainder to B may be said
to be functionally indistinguishable from the normal case covered by section
2036: (1) A continued to enjoy the property during her life; (2) possession of the
property passed to B only at A's death; and (3) at her death, A conferred a net
economic benefit on B. Indeed, this transaction may have been intentionally
donative. A may have expected the property to appreciate and wanted to pass this
anticipated increment on to B as a gift, but structured the transfer so that she
could continue her lifetime enjoyment of the property while also avoiding any
current economic loss.78

76. See supra note 60, where it is shown that $373,629 will grow to $500,001 over
five years (the actuarially-<ietermined remainder of A's life) when it is invested at 6% interest
compounded annually.
77. This of course assumes that had B retained the consideration he paid A for the
remainder, it would have grown in his hands at the same rate as that used in determining the
remainder's present value (i.e., 6% compounded annually) rather than the greater growth rate
realized on Blackacre.
78. B could also realize an economic gain if A fails to live out her actuarially
determined life expectancy. In that case, B will forgo a return on the consideration he paid A for
a shorter period than envisioned by the actuarial tables, and thus his loss of return will be less
than the amount by which Blackacre's value was discounted in determining the remainder's
present value. Sellers in poor health may actually anticipate this type of "gain" and intend it as
a gift when they sell a remainder interest to a close family member at its actuarially detcrmined
value. Arguably such gain should be taxed. Of course, a buyer of a remainder will incur an
economic loss if the seller outlives her life expectancy, but tax planners can be counted on to
avoid this technique where the seller's health is robust. See infra text accompanying notcs 79-81
for an alternative approach that could be used to measure and tax this typc of gain or loss.
The current regulations attempt to limit tax avoidance by prohibiting the use of thc
actuarial tables to value an individual's interest where "there is at least a 50 percent probability
that the individual will die within I year." Regs. § 20.7520-3(b)(3). Howcvcr, taxpaycrs may
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Consequently, a plausible case exists for applying section 2036 to tax
any appreciation that occurs between the time the remainder is sold and the
seller's death. One way of accomplishing this is to include the underlying
property in the seller's gross estate at its date-of-death value but then allow the
estate an offset for the consideration paid alld the imputed income thereon from
the date ofsale through the date ofdeath 79
If the underlying property does not appreciate and the seller lives out her
life expectancy, this approach will produce the same result as excluding the
property from the seller's gross estate, since the offset will exactly equal the
property's value. This is because offset is the amount that the consideration,
when invested at the imputed interest rate, will grow to over the seller's life
expectancy. This amount will equal the property's date-of-death value when there
is no appreciation. so On the other hand, this way of applying section 2036 will
capture any appreciation that occurs in the underlying property while such
appreciation would escape taxation if section 2036 did not apply.s,

apparently use them in all other cases (e.g.• where there is an 80% chance that an individual \vill
fail to live out his 5-year life expectancy but only a 40% chance that he will die \vithin one
year). See Regs. § 20.7520-1(a)(I) and infra text accompanying notes 119-20.
79. Use of the actual growth in the consideration (Le.• income plus appreciation)
would arguably be more accurate but presents difficult tracing problems. Imputed income. based
on the applicable federal rates. is more practicable. Cf. Lowndes. supra note 21. at 56-60
(discussing tracing problems in an analogous case of determining the § 2043 offsct). Professor
Dodge argues that use of an "actual consideration" approach is not conceptually mandated in
that situation. Dodge, supra note 21, at A-87.
80. Consider again the case presented in note 60 where A. having a life expectancy
offive years, sells a remainder in Blackacre (fair market value: S500.000) for its actuarial value
of $376,629. Assume also thatA lives exactly her actuarially-determined life expectancy of five
years and that Blackacre does not appreciate. As can be seen below. the method suggested in
the text for applying § 2036 produces the same result as if § 2036 did not apply.
Where Blackacre Does Not Appreciate
§ 2036
Not Applicable

Consideration & income thereon
actually in estate (based on an
assumed yield of 6% per annum)
Date-of-death value of Blackacre
Offset (as described in text)

§ 2036 Applies But
Offset For Consideration
and Imputed Income Thereon

$500.000

S500.000

Not Included

S500.000

Not Applicable

(S500.000)

S500.000
Net amount included in gross estate $500,000
81. Assume the same facts as in the example in supra note 80. except that Blackacre
appreciates to $700.000. As can be seen below. the method of applying § 2036 described in the
text (date of-death value of property minus consideration minus imputed income on
consideration) will tax the appreciation of $200.000 whereas such appreciation goes untaxed
if § 2036 does not apply.
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The trouble is that no matter how appealing this approach may be as a
matter of policy, it is incompatible with the current statutory framework.
First, section 2043(a) takes no account of the income or other growth
realized on the consideration following the date of sale, but ftxes the offset at the
consideration's value on the date of its receipt. 82
Secondly, this approach employs hindsight while the present "adequate
and full consideration" exception focuses on the facts existing on the date of sale.
Under the suggested approach, section 2036 would have operative effect only if
underlying property had appreciated by the time of the seller's death, a fact that
is unknown and unknowable at the time of the sale. In contrast, the current
"adequate and full consideration" exception asks: Was the sale a "bona ftde sale
for adequate and full consideration"? This answer depends on the facts existing
and known on the date of sale. If a person sells property in an arm's length
transaction for its fair market value on the date of sale, this condition is satisfied.
The possibility that the property may (or in fact does) subsequently appreciate
in no way negates the existence of a "bona ftde sale for adequate and full
consideration. ,,83
The decisions in D 'Ambrosio and Wheeler are clearly correct under the
existing statutory framework.

B. The IRS's "Legitimate" Concern: Value Manipulation-And Congress's
Response
Was the Government's position in D'Ambrosio and Wheeler simply a
case of perverse obduracy? I do not think so. I believe instead that the

Where Blackacre Appreciates
§ 2036
Not Applicable

§ 2036 Applies But
Offset For Consideration
and Imputed Income Thereon

Consideration & income thereon
actually in estate (based on an
assumed yield of 6% per annum)

$500,000

$500,000

Date-of-death value of Blackacre

Not Included

Offset (as described in text)

Not Applicable

$700,000
($500,000)

Net amount included in gross estate $500,000
$700,000
82. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
83. See United States v. Righter, 400 F.2d 344, 348 (8th Cir. 1968) (whether a
transfer is a "bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration" can only be decided "at the
time of the transfer and cannot be deferred and made to hang on future fortuitous circumstances
of longevity and of income"). Cf. Joseph M. Dodge, Redoing the Estate and Gift Taxes Along
Easy-ta-Value Lines, 43 Tax L. Rev. 241, 244 (1988) (transfer tax system should be revised to
avoid "reliance on estimates of, or speculation about, future events.... Hindsight ... should
be used whenever possible.") Id.
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Government was using its conceptually flawed position on "adequate and full
consideration" to foreclose a tax avoidance opportunity made possible by the
then existing valuation rules.
Prior to the enactment of section 2702, taxpayers could structure the
transfer of a remainder combined with a retained income interest so that
Government's actuarial tables would substantially overvalue the retained income
interest and correspondingly undervalue the remainder.
For example, in the case of a person transferring a remainder interest in
trust while retaining a life income interest. the trustee could invest the trust funds
in companies that plow their earnings back into their businesses rather than
paying them out as dividends. "Growth stocks" in publicly held companies and
stock in almost all closely held corporations fall in this category. Retention of a
corporation's earnings, of course, increases the value of its stock thereby
ultimately benefiting the trust remaindermen, but by the same token reduces and
possibly eliminates altogether the value of a transferor's retained income interest.
Since the Government's tables assume that all income is being paid to the income
beneficiary, using the tables in this case will overvalue the income interest and
undervalue the remainder. By investing in these types of stocks, the income that
the tables assume is being paid to the income beneficiary is shifted to the
remainderman in the form of stock appreciation.
This ability to create disparities between economic value and table value
offered an opportunity for tax avoidance. The facts of D'Ambrosio provide an
excellent illustration. 84 The decedent and her son were sole shareholders of a
corporation. 85 The decedent. who held noncumulative convertible preferred stock
worth $2,350,000, sold a remainder interest in her stock to the corporation for
a private annuity valued at approximately $1,320,000. 86 Not a single penny of
dividends was paid on this stock during the approximately three years decedent
lived following the sale. 87 Decedent's retained income interest in the stock
provided her \vith no economic benefit. Nevertheless, the Government
surprisingly-maybe shockingly--conceded that the value ofher income interest
was $1,030,000. 88 Correspondingly, the remainder was valued at only

84. The transaction in D'Ambrosio occurred before the effective date of
§ 2702. Decedent's sale of the remainder occurred in 1987. See D'Ambrosio v. Commissioner,
105 T.C. 252, 253, rev'd, 101 F.3d 309 (3d Cir. 1996), cen. denied. 117 S. Ct. 1822 (1997).
Section 2702 applies to transfers after October 8. 1990. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 11602(e)(1)(A)(i), 104 Stat. 1388-1 (1990).
85. See D'Ambrosio, 105 T.C. at 253.
86. See id. at 253-54. The numbers in the text have bcen rounded to the nearest
$10,000.
87. See id. at 254 n.4.
88. Since the total value of the stock was $2,350.000. and the stipulatcd value of the
remainder interest was $1,320,000. the resulting value of the income interest was SI.030.000.
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$1,320,000 [$2,350,000 - $1,030,000 =$1,320,000]. This enabled the estate to
argue that the decedent had received "adequate and full consideration" for the
remainder, namely the $1,320,000 annuity, and thus that section 2036 did not
apply. Adding "icing on the cake," the decedent died prematurely after receiving
only $590,000 of annuity payments. 89
As a result of the taxpayer's ultimate victory in D'Ambrosio, the
decedent succeeded in transferring $2,350,000 ofvalue (the stock's date-of-death
value)90 via the corporation to her son (its only other shareholder), while her
estate was replenished for this transfer by only $590,000 of annuity payments.
Thus, approximately $1,760,000 of value was passed to her sonfree ofall gift
and estate tax. 91 This result was the combined effect of valuing the decedent's
income interest at $1,030,000, when its economic value to her was effectively
zero, and her premature death which caused her to receive only $590,000 from
an annuity valued at $1,320,000.
Congress enacted section 2702 to prevent results like this. Section 2702
provides that where a person transfers property in trust to or for the benefit of a
family member, any interest he retains will be valued at zero for gift tax purposes
unless it is a "qualified interest."92 When a person gratuitously transfers
property, he makes a taxable gift to the extent the property's fair market value
exceeds the value of any interest he retains. 93 Consequently, if he transfers a
remainder to a family member while retaining a nonqualified interest, his taxable
gift will be the full value of the transferred property since his retained interest
will be valued at zero. On the other hand, if he retains a qualified interest, his

See id. The Tax Court noted that because of the stipulation, it was relieved from deciding
"whether Decedent's reserved life estate in a noncumulative preferred stock from which she
received no dividends following the transaction at issue actually had value." Id.
89. Id. at 254.
90. See id.
91. The approximate amount listed in the text as passing free ofestate and gift taxes,
$1,760,000, was computed by subtracting the annuity payments decedent received, $590,000,
from the value of the stock at her death, $2,350,000. This computation assumes that decedent
did not consume any portion of her annuity payments so that they were fully included in her
gross estate. Any portion of the payments she consumed would of course reduce the amount
included in her gross estate, thereby increasing the net tax savings. Conversely, the amount
passing tax free would be reduced to the extent she earned income on her annuity payments that
remained unconsumed at the time of her death.
92. IRC § 2702(a)(I), (a)(2)(A).
93. See Regs. § 25.25l2-5(d)(2) ("When the donor transfers property in trust or
otherwise and retains an interest therein, generally, the value of the gift is the value of the
property transferred less the value of the donor's retained interest."); Regs. § 25.2702-1 (b)
("The amount of the gift, if any, is then determined by subtracting the value of the interests
retained by the transferor or any applicable family member from the value of the transferred
property.").
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retained interest will be valued in the normal manner under the Government's
actuarial table. 94
The two principal types of qualified retained interests are a qualified
annuity interest (a "GRAT interest") and a qualified unitrust interest.9S In a
GRAT, the holder of the retained interest is entitled to receive annually a fixed
dollar amount regardless of the property's actual income or valUe,96 while in a
unitrust he is entitled to receive each year a fixed percentage of the property's
fair market value (including any accumulated income) determined annually.97 In
a GRAT, the dollar amount remains fixed while in a unitrust the payout
percentage remains fixed.
Qualified interests are designed to frustrate any attempt to shift value
from the holder of the retained interest to the remainderman. This is achieved by
requiring the trust to pay each year to the holder of the qualified interest either
a fixed dollar amount (the annuity amount) or a fixed percentage of the trust's
value (the unitrust amount) regardless of the trust's actual income. Thus, even
if a trustee invests exclusively in nondividend paying stocks (such as the
preferred stockinD 'Ambrosio), the trust will nonetheless be required to pay each
year either the annuity amount or the unitrust amount to the holder of the retained
interest. This permits more accurate valuation of the retained interest and
precludes the manipulative shifts of value that occurred in D'Ambrosio.
Under the regulations, a person who sells a remainder to a family
member and retains a nonqualified interest (e.g., a common law life estate) is
treated as making a gift to the remainderman.98 The amount of the gift is the
property's value less the consideration received for the remainder. 'J9 In effect, the
regulations treat the seller as transferring the entire property (not just the
remainder) in exchange for the consideration received. If D 'Ambrosio occurred
today (and the Government again accepted the table values as the true values of
the various interests), the decedent, who had retained a nonqualified common law

94. See IRC § 2702(a)(2)(B).
95. SeeIRC § 2702(b)(l), (2). A noncontingent remainder interest is also a qualified
interest if all the other interests in the trusts are either qualified annuity or unitrust interests.
See IRC § 2702(b)(3). Moreover, § 2702 does not apply 10 "regular" personal residence trusts
and qualified personal residence trusts. Such a trust consists of the grantor's residence in which
he retains either a lifetime or term interest See IRC § 2702(a)(3)(A)(ii); see Regs. §§ 25.27025(b),25.2702-5(c).
96. See IRC § 2702(b)(1). However, the regulations pemlit the fixed dollar amount
ofthe distribution to decrease from year 10 year, see Regs. § 25.2702-3(e), ex. 3, and also permil
the amount to increase but by no more than 120% of the annuity amount paid during the
preceding year. See Regs. § 25.2702-3(b)(l)(ii)(B).
97. See IRC § 2702(b)(2). The regulations permit the unitruSI amount to be increased
up to 120% of the unitrust percentage paid for the preceding year. Regs. § 25.2702·3(c)(1)(ii).
98. See Regs. §§ 25.2702-4(a), 25.2702-4(d), ex. 2.
99. See Regs. § 25.2702-4(d), ex. 2.
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life estate in the preferred stock, would be deemed to have made a taxable gift of
$1,030,000, that is, the value of her preferred stock, $3,250,000, less the value
of her annuity, $1,320,000. In one way, this result is harsher than if the decedent
had retained the stock outright and bequeathed it to her son, since payment of the
tax is accelerated from the date of death to the date of sale.
Enactment of section 2702 should eliminate most, if not all, of the IRS's
concerns about possible tax abuses arising under the old valuation rules.
Whatever merit the Service's position on adequacy of consideration may once
have possessed no longer exists. The Service should now hold that in a simple
sale of a remainder, payment of the remainder's actuarial value constitutes
"adequate and full consideration."

C. Tax Considerations in Selling a Remainder Today: The Effects ofSection
2702 and the Holdings of the D'Ambrosio Trilogy
Because of section 2702, selling a remainder to a family member will be
less tax efficient today even if the holdings of the D'Ambrosio trilogy are
followed. Section 2702 effectively compels a grantor establishing a GRAT IOO to
base his annual annuity payment on an interest rate that is at least as high as the
rate used under section 7520 in valuing term and remainder interests (the "section
7520 rate"). Otherwise the grantor will be deemed to be making a gift for tax
purposes. However, the section 7520 rate will almost invariably be higher than
the actual income yield from the trust. Consequently, to avoid a gift tax upon the
establishment of a GRAT, the annual payment to the grantor must be set at an
abnormally high amount, and these enlarged payments, unless consumed by the
grantor, will inflate his gross estate. This phenomenon is best illustrated by a
concrete example.
Suppose P, aged 55, establishes a trust of $100,000 in which she
reserves a life estate, and sells the remainder interest to her child C. If the section
7520 rate at the time is 6%, the present value of the C's remainder will be
$30,473. 101 For P to avoid gift tax liability on her sale of the remainder, the
annual annuity payment she receives from the GRAT must be fixed using an
interest rate at least as high as the section 7520 rate. Here that rate is 6% so the
GRAT must pay P$6,000 annually [6% of $100,000]. If the payment were less,
only a part of the trust's assumed income of $6,000 would be considered paid

100. A taxpayer trying to avoid the draconian rule of § 2702(a)(2)(A) valuing retained
interests at zero will nonnally use a GRAT rather than a unitrust ifthe trust property is expected
to appreciate. The annual payments in a unitrust will increase as the trust property
appreciates-and thus inflate the transferor's gross estate-while such payments will remain
constant in a GRAT.
101. See Actuarial Values, supra note 60, Table S (6.0) at 1-20.
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out, and the balance would be viewed as retained for future distribution to the
remainderman C. The present value ofthese assumed income accumulations over
P's anticipated lifetime would constitute a taxable gift to C.
Section 7520 requires that life estates, remainders and similar interests
be valued by assuming an income yield of 120% of the federal midterm rate (i.e.,
the average market yield on U.S. debt obligations having a remaining maturity
of more than three years but no more than nine years). 102 The rub is that this rate
will almost invariably exceed the actual income yield from the trust. Almost all
trusts invest a significant portion of their funds in stock. 103 The section 7520 rate
however is based on the yields on Government debt securities (augmented by a
20% premium). Since the early 1960s, these yields have consistently exceeded
the dividend rates on equities, and hence the section 7520 rate, being keyed to
yields on Government securities, will almost invariably exceed the actual income
yields of a trust that has a significant investment in stocks.lt).l
Suppose the actual rate of income realized by the trust in the above
example is 4%. Before the enactment of section 2702, there would almost
certainly be no gift tax liability if C paid $30,473 for the remainder (its table
value based on an assumed yield of 6%) even though the actual annual income
yield was only 4%, i.e., $4,000. 105 Under current law, the annual GRAT payment

102. See IRC §§ 7520(a), I274(d)( I).
103. See Robert B. Wolf, Defeating the Duty 10 Disappoint Equally-The Total
Return Trust, 32 Real Prop., Prob. & Tr. J. 45, 51 (1997) ("most corporate fiduciaries are
reluctant to invest less than one-half of their long-term portfolios in equity securities, simply
because ofthe duty of impartiality [as between the income beneficiary and the remainderman I
and the historical truth that fixed income investments yield dramatically less in total return over
long periods of time").
104. One study found that income returns, as opposed to total returns. on long-term
government bonds and intermediate-term government bonds exceeded the income returns on
large company stocks every year during the period 1959 through 1995. See Ibbotson Associates,
Stocks, Bonds, Bills, and Inflation 1996 Yearbook 40-41, Table 2-6. Moreover, the spread has
been increasing. In 1959, the spread between the income return on long-term government bonds
and large company stock was only 0.70 percentage points (4.01 c;o \'5. 3.31%) but by 1995 the
spread had increased to 4.69 percentage points (7.60% vs. 2.91 %). Id. Consequently, it will be
virtually impossible for a trust which has a significant stock investment to generate an income
yield equivalent to that of government bonds. As of January I, 1997, intermediate government
bonds were yielding about 6.5% while the Standard & Poor's 500 stock index was }ielding
about 2%. If the portfolio were an even mix of stocks and bonds. the net yield (after charging
trustee's fees of 0.35% to income) would be only 3.9%, substantially less than the 6.5% yield
on intermediate-term government bonds. See Wolf, supra note 103, at 50-51.
105. The rule applied by the courts was that the actuarial tables must be used unless
it was shown that their use produces a "substantially unrealistic and unreasonable result. and
a more reasonable and realistic means of determining value is available." O'Reilly v.
Commissioner, 973 F.2d 1403,1408 (8thCir. 1992).lnRev. Rul. 77-195,1977-1 C.B. 295, the
Service held that the 6% actuarial tables then in effect had to be used in valuing a life estate,
even though the trust was funded with stock of a company that had paid an average dhidend in
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would have to be $6,000 to avoid gift tax liability, and these enlarged payments
in turn will augment P's gross estate.
This enlargement of P's gross estate can be avoided by fIxing the annuity
payment below the amount determined under the section 7520 rate, but in that
case P will be deemed to make a taxable gift to C. If the annual annuity payment
to P were fIxed at $4,000 to reflect the trust's actual income, P would be deemed
to make a taxable gift to C of $23, 176. 106 To avoid a taxable gift, P would have
to charge C an additional $23,176 for the remainder, and this amount (and
earnings thereon) would be included in P's gross estate. Alternatively, the trust
might invest exclusively in fIxed income securities and thereby attempt to match
its actual return with the section 7520 rate. This approach however will probably
produce inferior investment results, since the economic return on equity
investments (income plus appreciation) has historically outperformed the return
on debt instruments. 107
In short, selling a remainder today to a family member presents a series
of unappealing choices. Nevertheless, selling a remainder can still, in certain
cases, produce benefIcial tax results if the D'Ambrosio trilogy's view of
adequate consideration prevails.

each of the preceding 10 years of 3% and the trustee was forbidden to dispose of the stock. See
also Vernon v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 484 (1976) (holding that 6% actuarial tables had to be
used in val uing life income interest when trust funded with stock paying an average annual yield
of 3.75% over preceding seven years despite settlor's nonbinding admonition to trustee not to
sell stock). A variation of two percentage points (4% vs. 6%) when the trustee's ability to
change investments is unrestricted seems well within the variance permitted by these
authorities.
The courts have occasionally rejected use ofthe tables. See O'Reilly, 973 F.2d 1403
(rejecting use of 10% tables in valuing remainder when trust funded with stock historically
yielding about 0.2% and trustees relieved of duty to diversify or increase income); Hanley v.
United States, 105 Ct. CI. 638 (Ct. CI. 1945) (rejecting use of 4% tables in case of portfolio
yielding 3.09% on valuation date when trustees' reinvestment offunds were restricted to loweryielding government and municipal bonds).
106. The value of the remainder interest in a GRAT is determined by subtracting the
value of the annuity from the principal of the trust. Regs. § 25.2702-l(b); see also Regs.
§ 1.664-2(c) (valuation of remainder in a charitable remainder trust). Thus:
Value of trust principal
Less value of annuity
Value of remainder
Less consideration received
Amount of gift

$100,000
46.351
53,649
30,473
$ 23,176

The value ofthe annuity was determined by multiplying the annual annuity payment, $4000, by
the factor for a lifetime annuity of a person aged 55 when the interest rate is 6%, 11.5878. See
Actuarial Values, supra note 60, Table S (6.0) at 1-20. All figures rounded to the nearest dollar.
107. See Wolf, supra note 103, at 57-60.
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1. Sales of Remainders in High-Growth Properties to Family
Members.-If the holdings of the D'Ambrosio trilogy are followed, sales of a
remainder in a GRAT to a family member can be tax advantageous where the
economic growth in the trust property (this is, its income plus appreciation)
exceeds the section 7520 rate. lOS
In that case, only a portion of the GRAT s growth will be used to fund
the annual annuity payments to the grantor. The balance will be kept in the trust
and will pass to the remainderman upon the trust's termination. If the remainderman paid full actuarial value for his remainder interest. there will be no gift tax
on the establishment of the trust, and under the holdings of the D'Ambrosio
trilogy, no estate tax at the grantor's death. 109 Since the GRAT will be excluded
from the grantor's gross estate, the portion of the growth not used to fund the
annual annuity payments passes to the remainderman free of any transfer tax. I 10
The actual reduction in the grantor's gross estate-and thus the tax
benefit of this strategy, if any-depends not only on the rate of growth in the
GRAT property, but also on the offsetting increases in the grantor's gross estate
resulting from her receipt of consideration from the sale of the remainder, her
annuity payments, and any growth on those amounts. III

108. See Lawrence P. Katzenstein. Economic and Valuation Planning Opportunities:
GRITS, GRATS, GRUTS and QPRTS, SB90 ALI-ABA 1221 (1997). Mr. Katzenstein points
out that if the GRAT's rate ofeconomic growth exceeds the § 7520 rate. the grantor will be able
to transfer the excess amount to family members without transfer talt cost. See id. at 1223-27.
See also Jonathan G. Blattmachr & Georgiana J. Slade. Partial Interests-GRATs. GRUTs.
QRPTs (Section 2702),836 Tax MgmL (BNA) § IV.F.2. at A-42 (1996) (noting that GRAT is
effective transfer tax technique only where GRAT earns more than the applicable § 7520 rate).
109. See supra notes 33-35 (gift tax). and 7-9 (estate talt).
110. Assume M, having a life expectancy of five years. establishes a GRAT with
property having a value of $100.000 when the § 7520 rate is 6c:h; fixes the annual annuity
payment at $6,000 (based on the § 7520 rate of 6%); and sells the remainder interest therein to
N, a family member, for its actuarial value of S74.726. Actuarial Values. supra note 60. Table
B (6.0) at 3-10. Assume that M exactly lives out her life expectancy of five years and that the
GRAT property realizes economic growth of 15c:h during that period. Because the annuity
payments remained fixed at S6.000 while the actual economic growth in the GRAT was 15%.
the GRAT will have grown from S100.000 when At created it, to S160.682 when she died-an
increase in value of S60,681 :
Value ofGRAT
Growth in value of
Annuity payment
Value ofGRAT
at
year-beginning
GRAT
during
year
during
year
at year-cnd
Year
$100,000
S15.000
(S6.000)
S109.000
1
109,000
16.350
(6.000)
119.350
2
119,350
17.903
(6.000)
131.253
3
131.253
19.688
(6.000)
144.940
4
144,941
21.741
(6.000)
160.681
5
Ill. For example. assume in the case described in the preceding footnote that M
realized a 10% growth rate on the consideration she received for the remainder (Le.• $74.726)
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An obvious risk in this strategy is that the economic growth in the ORAT
property may fail to exceed the section 7520 rate; indeed, it is always possible
that the ORAT property may experience a loss. If so, the strategy may
boomerang, since the amount removed from the grantor's gross estate (i.e., the
value of the ORAT upon the grantor's death) is likely to be less than the amount
added back to her gross estate by the consideration received for the remainder,
the annuity payments, and any growth in these amounts.
Nevertheless, taxpayers who are convinced that the total economic return
on the underlying property will significantly outpace the section 7520 rate may
want to consider selling a remainder to a family member. If they live outside the
Third, Fifth or Ninth Circuits, they must also assess the likelihood of their circuit
following the holdings of the D 'Ambrosio trilogy. Moreover, their planners will
need to determine how to fund the annual annuity payments since income alone
will probably be insufficient to cover them.

2. Sales ofRemainders to Nonfamily Members.-Section 2702 applies
only to transfers made to or on behalf of a member of the transferor's family. 112
"Member of the family" is broadly defined as meaning the transferor's ancestors
and lineal descendents and those of his spouse, the transferor's siblings, spouses
of the foregoing persons, and the transferor's own spouse. 113 Although

and on her annual $6000 payments from the GRAT. In that case, the reduction in M's gross
estate would be $44,158 rather than the $60,681 appreciation in the value of the GRAT:
Amount in M's gross estate if she retains property instead of selling remainder:
Value at M's death of property (Le., $100,000 compounded annually
at 15% for 5 years)

$201,136

Amount in M's gross estate if she creates GRAT and sells remainder therein:
Value at M' s death of consideration received for
remainder + growth thereon (i.e., $74,726 compounded
annually at 10% for 5 years)
Plus value of annuity payments + growth thereon
(i.e., $6,000 annual payments compounded annually at 10%)

$120,347

36,631

Value at M' s death of property replacing remainder
Net reduction in M's gross estate by selling remainder

156,978
44,158

Note that the actual period that the decedent lives after the sale of the remainder will also affect
the amount of the reduction, if any, in her gross estate.
112. See IRC § 2702(a)(l).
113. IRC §§ 2702(e), 2704(c)(2).
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comprehensive, this definition omits the transferor's nephews, nieces, cousins,
their respective descendants, as well as any unmarried "significant other" of the
transferor.
A taxpayer may therefore sell a remainder to any of these persons (or
any other non-family member) and retain a nonqualified interest (e.g., a common
law life estate) in the property without triggering section 2702. The great
advantage of avoiding section 2702 is that both the seller's retained interest and
the remainder will be valued in the normal fashion using the applicable section
7520 rate. Indeed, according to the Regulations, the section 7520 rate is to be
used regardless of the trust's actual income yield so long as the income
beneficiary may compel the trustee to "make the trust corpus productive
consistent with income yield standards for trusts under applicable state law.,,114
This is so even if the state-mandated minimum yield is "substantially below the
section 7520 interest rate" on the valuation date. liS
These rules provide an opportunity for transferring value to nonfamily
members free oftransfer tax. If the owner of a property sells a remainder interest
therein to a nonfamily member for the remainder's present value (as computed
by using the section 7520 rate), there will be no gift tax at the time of the sale,
and under the D'Ambrosio trilogy holdings, no estate tax when the owner dies. 116
However, if-as is usually the case-the section 7520 rate exceeds the trust's
actual income yield, 117 the income interest will be overvalued and the remainder
undervaluecl. 1l8 This "bargain element" in the sale of the remainder passes free
of all gift and estate tax to the remainderman.

3. Sales ofRemainders by Persons Who Are Ill, But Not Too Ill, for
Private Annuities.-At first glance, it would seem that one in e;t:tremis could
114. Regs. § 20.752Q-3(b)(2)(v), ex. 2. The gift tax regulations contain a comparable
provision. Regs. § 25.7520-3(b)(2)(v), ex. 2.
115. See Regs. § 20.7520-3(b)(2)(v), ex. 2. These regulations appear to assume a
degree ofspecificity concerning "income yield standards for trusts under applicable state law,"
id., which does not exist The Restatement of Trusts recognizes a "fiduciary duty to make the
trust estate productive of trust accounting income." Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 227 cml.
i. (1990). However, the amount of income which the trustee must try to generate is dependent
on the "trust's circumstances and tenns." Id.
To assure the applicability of the actuarial tables, it may be advisable to explicitly
grant the income beneficiary the right to compel the trustee to make the trust corpus "productive
consistent with income standards for trusts under applicable state law." However, to the extent
the income beneficiary fails to exercise this right, he may be deemed to have made a taxable
transfer of the amount he was entitled to, thereby possibly triggering gift and estate tax liability.
Cf. Dickman v. Commissioner, 465 u.S. 330 (1984). Given the vague nature ofstate law on this
subject, this possibility appears highly unlikely except in the most egregious cases.
116. See supra notes 33-35 (gift tax), and 7-9 (estate tax).
117. See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
118. See discussion supra Part ill B.
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dramatically reduce his gross estate by selling a remainder in his property for an
annuity having the same actuarial value as the remainder. Because of the seller's
foreshortened life, the actuarial tables will overvalue his retained income interest
and correspondingly undervalue the remainder. This, in turn, will permit the
remainder to be sold for less than its true worth and yet be considered sold for
"adequate and full consideration." Furthermore, because the seller lives for a
shorter period than indicated by the actuarial tables, the amount he receives
under his annuity (and thus the amount included in his gross estate) will be less
than the annuity's actuarial value.
To prevent this windfall, the regulations under section 7520 proscribe
use of the Government's actuarial tables where the person whose interest is being
valued "is known to have an incurable illness or other deteriorating physical
condition" on the valuation date and "there is at least a 50 percent probability
that the individual will die within 1 year.,,1l9 The corollary is that the tables will,
indeed must, be used where the individual has more than a 50% chance of
surviving a year. 120 Apparently this is so even ifhis poor health makes it unlikely
that he will live out his full actuarial life expectancy.
A person in this condition (i.e., in poor health but having a more than a
50% chance of surviving one year) can reduce his gross estate by selling a
remainder interest in his property for a private annuity having the same actuarial
value as that of the remainder, provided he fails to live out his full life
expectancy. Since the actuarial values ofthe annuity and the remainder are equal,
the sale will be for "adequate and full consideration." Thus there will be no gift
tax liability, and under the D'Ambrosio trilogy holdings, no estate tax. 121 Any
amounts the seller receives under the annuity (and any income thereon) which
remain unconsumed at death will be included in his gross estate, but because of
his shortened life, these amounts should be significantly less than the value
eliminated from his estate.

4. Sale of a Remainder in a Residence to a Family Member.-A
transfer of a remainder interest in a trust whose sole asset consists of the income
beneficiary's residence (a "personal residence trust") is exempt from the

119. Regs. § 25.7520-3(b)(3) (gift tax regulations). If the individual survives by 18
months or longer after the gift is completed, he is presumed not to have been terminally ill on
that date "unless the contrary is established by clear and convincing evidence." Id. The estate
tax regulations have a comparable provision that contains certain exceptions not found in the
gift tax regulation. See Regs. § 20.7520-3(b)(3) (estate tax regulations).
120. See Regs. §§ 20.7520-1(a)(1), 25.7520-1(a)(1).
121. See supra notes 33-35 (gift tax), and 7-9 (estate tax). If the sale is to a family
member, the seller must retain a qualified interest to avoid having it treated as a gift. See IRe
§ 2702(a).
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provisions of section 2702. 122 The regulations provide that the transfer of a
remainder interest in a "qualified personal residence trust" (a "QPRY'), which
is similar to a personal residence trust but more flexible, is also exempt. 123
Therefore, the regular valuation rules will prevail, and if the remainder is sold for
its actuarial value, there will be no gift tax liability, and under the holdings of the
D'Ambrosio trilogy, no estate tax.
The sale of a remainder interest in a personal residence trust or a QPRT
will be an attractive option where the value of the residence is expected to
appreciate at a greater rate than the return on the reinvested sales proceeds.

IV. THE EFFECT OF THE D'AMBROSIO TRILOGY ON SPOUSAL ELECTIONS
A. Tales ofTax Avoidance

The spousal election technique offers opportunities for substantial
transfer tax savings, particularly ifthe holdings ofthe D'Ambrosio trilogy extend
to this technique. Consider the following cases.

1. The Untutored Estate Plan.-H and W, who live in a community
property state, have each decided to leave their respective shares of the
community in trust, with income payable to the survivor for life and principal
passing to their child C upon the survivor's death. A scrivener, lacking in tax
sophistication, prepares \vills implementing this plan. H predeceases lV, and at
the time ofhis death, each spouse's share of the community is worth $1,000,000.
At W's death, the value of her property has increased to $1,500,000.
Assuming that H's executor forgoes a QTIP election 120$ so as to equalize
the two estates, the tax consequences will be as follows:

122. IRe § 2702(a)(3)(A)(ii). The specific requirements for qualif}ing as a "personal
residence trust" are set out in Regs. § 25.2702-5(b).
123. The requirements for qualifying as a QPRT are set out in Regs. § 25.2702-5{c).
A QPRT has been summarized as follows:
A qualified personal residence trust must satisfy the general requirements applicable
to a regular personal residence trust. but is permitted (l) to hold cash and other assets
that are related to the residence; (2) to sell the residence and reinvest the proceeds in
another residence; (3) to receive or make improvements to the residence; and (4) to
be converted into a qualified annuity trust As a result of its flexibility, a qualified
personal residence trust. rather than a regular personal residence trust, generally will
be used by taxpayers wishing to avoid Section 2702.
Richard B. Stephens et al., Federal Estate and Gift Taxation 119.03[3][d][iii) (7th ed. 1996)
(footnotes omitted).
124. H's executor could elect under § 2056(b)(7) to treat his bequest as "qualified
terminable interest property" (i.e., "QTIP") and thus qualify for the marital deduction, since \V
has a "qualifying income interest for life."
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CASE I

H's Estate:

$1,000,000 less the $650,000
exclusion amount (§ 2010)125
W's Estate:
$1,500,000 less the $650,000
exclusion amount (§ 2010)
Total value of property subject to transfer tax

$350,000
850,000
$1,200,000

2. The Spousal Election Will as an Estate Tax Saving Plan.-In this
scenario, Hand W go to a sophisticated tax planner who proposes a plan having
the same testamentary effect as the plan in Case 1 but with significant transfer
tax savings. Under his plan, each spouse leaves all of the community property
(including the other spouse's share) in trust with income payable to the survivor
for life and principal payable to C on the survivor's death. This, of course, gives
the survivor a spousal election. Hand Wenthusiastically adopt this plan because
of its purported tax benefits and because it carries out their dispositive wishes.
H dies first, and Welects to let her share of the community pass under
H's will into WTrust. As in Case 1, each spouse's share of the community at the
time of H's death is worth $1,000,000, and W's share (which is now in W Trust)
grows to $1,500,000 by the time ofher death. The transfer tax consequences will
depend on the absolute and relative values of W's life estate in H Trust and C's
remainder in W Trust.

a. Where W's Life Estate in H Trust is Worth Less Than C's
Remainder in W Trust.-Assume that at H's death the present value of W'slife
estate in H Trust is $400,000 and that the present value of C's remainder in W
Trust is $600,000.
For gift tax purposes, W is treated as exchanging the remainder interest
in W Trust for the income interest in H Trust. 126 Consequently, she will be deemed to make a gift of $200,000, that is, the value of the remainder she gives to C
in W Trust, $600,000, less the income interest she receives in H Trust, $400,000.
The method for determining the estate tax effect of the election is less
certain. Under Gradow, W's transfer of a remainder to C in W Trust would not
be supported by adequate consideration, since the value of her life estate in H
Trust (i.e., the consideration she received for setting up W Trust) is less than the
value of her property she allowed to pass into W Trust. 127 The D'Ambrosio
125. The "exclusion amount" is the amount ofwealth that may be transferred without
transfer tax by reason of the unified credit. See IRC §§ 2010 & 2505. The exclusion amount for
1999, $650,000, is used in the examples throughout this article. The exclusion amount is
scheduled to increase over a nine-year period and ultimately to reach $1,000,000 in the case of
estates of decedents dying in 2006 and thereafter. See IRC § 201O(c).
126. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 23-31 and accompanying text.
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trilogy courts arguably would find the consideration adequate so long as W's life
estate in H Trost equals or exceeds the value of the remainder she transferred to
C in W Trost. 128 However, the result here is the same regardless of which test is
used. The consideration received. W's $400,000 life estate in H Tntst, is
inadequate whether measured against the value of the remainder W surrendered,
$600,000, or the full value of the property she let pass into W Trust, $1,000,000.
However, W's estate is entitled to reduce W's gross estate by the value of her life
estate in H Trost (i.e., the $400,000 consideration W received), pursuant to
section 2043.
Ignoring for the time being the effect of section 2702, and assuming
again that H's executor forgoes a QTIP election, the transfer tax results will be
as follows:

CASE 2
H's Estate:

$1,000,000 less the $650,000
exclusion amount (§ 2010)
W's Gift
$600,000 (C's remainder in W
Trost) less $400,000 (W's life
estate in H Trust) and less $200,000
of the exclusion amount (§ 2505)
W's Estate:
$1,500,000 less $400,000 consideration
(§ 2043) and less the $650,000 exclusion
amount (§ 2010)129
Total value of property subject to transfer tax:

$350,000

-0-

450.000
$800,000

Behold the magic wrought by the tax planner! By using a spousal
election, the planner has reduced the total amount subject to transfer tax by
$400,000 while producing nearly the same testamentary result as in Case 1.
b. Where W's Life Estate in H Trust is Worth More Than C's
Remainder in W Trost.-Assume that the value of C's remainder in W Trust is
$400,000 and W's income interest in H's estate is $600,000. Even if Gradow is
still good law, the result will probably be better than in Case 2, simply because
the increased value of W's life estate ($600,000 vs. $400,000) should produce

128. See supra notes 41-54 and accompanying texL
129. W's estate is entitled to the full benefit ofthe "estate tax" exclusion amount even
though a part of the "gift tax" exclusion amount was used to detennine the portion of W's gift
(Le., C's remainder in WTrust) that was subject to gift tax. That gift is not an "adjusted taxable
gift" within the meaning of § 2001(b), since the full value of the underlying property will be
included in W's gross estate pursuant to § 2036. See IRe § 2001(b) (last sentence). Accordingly,
the gift is not included under § 2001 (b )(l)(B) in the computation onY's estate tax and therefore
does not "absorb" any part of the $650,000 "estate tax" exclusion amount.
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a corresponding larger offset under section 2043. If so, the tax results, again
assuming H's executor does not make a QTIP election and again ignoring the
effect of section 2702, will be as follows:
CASE 3

H's Estate:

$1,000,000 less the $650,000
exclusion amount (§ 2010)
W's Gift
$400,000 (C's remainder in W
Trust) less $600,000 (W's life
estate in H Trust)
W's Estate:
$1,500,000 less $600,000
consideration (§ 2043) and less the
$650,000 exclusion amount (§ 2010)
Total value of property subject to transfer tax:

$350,000

-0-

250,000
$600,000

The above computation assumes that the $200,000 increase in the value
of W's life estate (from $400,000 to $600,000) results in a corresponding
increase in the section 2043 offset. This can be disputed. If one views H's estate
as having "sold" W a life estate in H Trust in exchange for her gift of a
remainder to C in her property, H's estate has transferred something worth
$600,000 (Le., W's life estate in H Trust) but received something worth only
$400,000 (i.e., C's remainder in W Trust). One may argue that only $400,000
ofthe $600,000 value of W's life estate should be viewed as "consideration" paid
by H's estate, since that is the only value H's estate received for its money.130
Under this view, the remaining $200,000 would be treated as a bequest from H
to W. 13I If this analysis is adopted, the total amount subject to transfer tax will
be $400,00Q-the same as when W's life estate in H Trust was worth only
$400,000 (Case 2)-since the section 2043 offset is limited to the actual
consideration paid.
However, the underlying rationale of the Gradow line of cases strongly
supports the contrary result. Those cases measure the adequacy of the
consideration W receives (Le., her life estate in H Trust) by comparing it to the
value of the property she transfers into W Trust. 132 This implicitly views W' slife
estate in H Trust as "consideration," not only for the remainder W gives to C, but
also for all of the property she transfers into W Trust. If so, the entire value of

130. See Johanson, supra note 71, at 1307-09.
131. See Herbert E. Schwartz & Alan D. Liker, The Widow's Election, 1 Univ.
Miami mst. Est. Plan., ch. 67-10, tj[ 67.1032 (1967) ("The typical approach to an exchange by
related parties of property of unequal values . . . is to presume-for income as for gift tax
purposes-that the party receiving the smaller consideration has made a gratuitous transfer.").
132. See sources cited supra note 6.
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W's life estate will count as "consideration" for purposes of the section 2043
offset, since H's estate has received something (i.e., the entire amount W
permitted to pass into WTrust) having more value than what it gave up (Le.• W's
life estate in H Trust). There are some suggestions in the case law supporting this
result 133
Consequently, if Gradow is still good law. the result where W's life
estate in H Trust is worth more than C's remainder in W Trust. will be at least
as good-and likely better-than where the values of the life estates and
remainders are reversed.
But if the D 'Ambrosio trilogy has effectively overruled Gradow. the tax
saving becomes astounding. In that case. section 2036 will no longer apply and
hence no part of W Trust will be included in her gross estate, since W's transfer
of the remainder in W Trust (value: $400,000) to C in return for her life estate
in H Trust (value: $600.000) will be for "adequate and full consideration:"

CASE 4
H's Estate:

$1,000,000 less the $650.000
exclusion amount (§ 2010)
W's Gift
$400.000 (C's remainder in W
Trust) less $600.000 (W's life
estate in H Trust)
W's Estate:
Nothing included under §2036
Total value of property subject to transfer tax:

$350.000

-0-0$350,000

Note that without significantly changing the final dispositive result, use
of a spousal election has reduced the amount subject to transfer tax by $850.000
from what it would have been under the untutored plan. The results of Cases
1-4, based on existing law. are summarized below:

133. See United States v. Past, 347 F.2d 7, 13-16 (9th Cir. 1965) (allowing a § 2043
offset for the full value of W's life estate in H TnlSt. even though under its figures the life
estate's $143,000 value exceeded the $101,000 value of C's remainder in WTnlSt); see also
supra note 22 for a further discussion of Past; cf. Gradow v. United States, II Cl. Ct. 808, 810
(1987), aff'd, 897 F.2d 516 (Fed. Cir. 1990) ("Case law generally supports the conclusion
that ... [the § 2043] offset includes the actuarial value .•• of a life estate in [H's] share.).
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Total amount
Subject to transfer tax
$1,200,000

The Untutored Plan (Case 1)
The Spousal Election:
W's life estate in H Trust [$400,000]

< C's remainder in W Trust
[$600,000] (Case 2)
W's life estate in H Trust [$600,000]
>C's remainder in W Trust [$400,000];
Gradow still good law (Case 3)

$800,000

Probably $600,000
(but no more than $800,000)

W's life estate in H Trust [$600,000]
>C's remainder in W Trust [$400,000];
D'Ambrosio trilogy overrules Gradow (Case 4)

$350,000

3. Modifications to Avoid Section 2702; the Marital Deduction; and
Emergency Needs ofthe Surviving Spouse

a. Section 2702.-8ection 2702 applies to the typical spousal
election, because W, by allowing her share of the community to pass to W Trust,
is transferring property in trust for the benefit of a family member, C, while
retaining an interest for herself. If the draconian valuation rule of section
2702(a)(2)(A) applies, W will be deemed to have made a gift of the entire value
of W Trust-not just the remainder-to the extent it exceeds the value of her life
estate in H Trust. Hence the estate tax savings resulting from the spousal election
will be eroded by W's increased gift tax liability.
H can avoid this result by giving W a qualified annuity interest in W
Trust, thereby making it a GRAT. l34 W's interest will then be valued in
accordance with the normal actuarial tables (rather than arbitrarily at zero), and
the value of C's remainder will be limited to the remaining value of the property
W transfers into W Trust. 135 The downside is that a GRAT invariably results in
larger annual payments to W than a common law life estate, and these increased
payments, if not consumed, will increase the size of W's gross estate. 136

134. Although § 2702(a)(2)(A) can be avoided if W Trust is structured either as a
unitrust or a GRAT, W should normally retain a qualified annuity interest where the trust
property is expected to appreciate in value. This is because W's annual payments in a unitrust
will increase as the value of the trust property appreciates-and thus inflate her gross
estate-while such payments will remain constant in a GRAT despite any appreciation.
135. See IRe § 2702(a)(2)(B), (b)(l).
136. See supra notes 102-07 and accompanying text.
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However, this effect can be limited to W Trust, since there is no need to make H
Trust a GRAT. 137
If the value of W's life estate in H Trust exceeds the value of the
remainder she gives to C, the resulting tax savings will almost always exceed the
disadvantage caused by the increased payments to W (assuming that the
D 'Ambrosio trilogy holdings govern spousal elections). In that case., section 2036
will not apply since W will have received "adequate and full consideration" for
her transfer. This not only reduces the total amount subject to transfer tax, but
in many cases "frees up" W's unified credit. This was the situation in Case 4
above, where use of the spousal election reduced the amount subject to transfer
tax by $850,000, but also freed up W's entire unified credit. W can use this
"newly-liberated" unified credit to shelter gifts or testamentary dispositions ofthe
increased distributions she receives from W Trust and any noncommunity property she possesses. Even if the value of W's separate (i.e., noncommunity) property exceeds the exclusion amount, so that her unified credit is not "freed up," the
estate tax savings ofexcluding W Trust from W's gross estate will be substantial.
Moreover, W can always use her annual exclusion (if she is not otherwise doing
so) to rid her estate of any unconsumed distributions from the GRAT.
The benefits of this approach will not be as great if W's life estate in H
Trust is worth less than the remainder she gives to C. Then section 2036 will
apply, and W's estate's only consolation will be a section 2043 offset equal to the
value of W's life estate in H Trust computed as of H's death. This approach will
nevertheless be attractive if H intends to give Wall of his income from his estate
in any event Then the allowance of the section 2043 offset is a pure "freebie. "133
This was the situation in Case 2 above where adoption of the spousal election
approach reduced the total amount subject to transfer tax by $400,000. This
saving will help offset any enlargement of W's estate caused by the increased
annual payments from the GRAT (i.e., W Trust).

137. Ironically, § 2702 is not used to value the consideration W receives in a spousal
election (Le., her interest in H Trust) but is used to value the property she transfers in the same
transaction (Le., the remainder in W Trust). This result seems compelled by the statute's
language. Section 2702 applies to "any interest in ... trust retained by the transferor or any
applicable family member." IRe § 2702(a)(1 ) (emphasis added). Neither the decedent H nor his
estate is retaining any interest in the property transferred to H TnlSt. Likewise, W, an
"applicable family member" of H while he was alive, is not "retaining" any interest in the
property transferred to H Trust, since she had no interest in that property prior to the transfer.
See Regs. § 25.2702-2(d), ex. 3.
138. It will not be a "freebie" if H would otherwise have directed that some or all of
the income from his property be paid to another beneficiary during \V's life. For example, H may
feel that Whas sufficient income from her own property and that any additional income will only
inflate her taxable estate. He may also wish to minimize the overall income tax burden by
having income from his property spread among multiple beneficiaries who may be in a lower
tax bracket than W. H's use of the spousal election technique precludes these tax S3\ings.
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Moreover, the trustee of H Trust can, within reason, offset the effect of
excessively high distributions from W Trust by adopting a "high growth-low
income" investment strategy for H Trust. This is possible because H Trust need
not be a GRAT or a unitrust and therefore is not subject to the payout
requirements of those interests. If, for example, the section 7520 rate (and hence
the rate for computing the fixed annuity amount payable from W Trust) is 6%
at the time of W's election and the prevailing income yield in trusts is then 4%,
the trustee may be able to reduce (and even eliminate) the effect of the high
payouts from W Trust by investing the funds of H Trust in growth stocks
yielding 2-3%. This strategy would be particularly attractive if H's executor did
not make a QTIP election for H Trust. Then any increase in the value of the
principal of H Trust resulting from the "high growth-low income" investment
strategy will pass tax free at W's death. Conversely, any invasion of principal in
W Trust occasioned by the need to fund's W's high fixed payments from that
trust will reduce any amount taxable at her death.
This strategy will not reduce the value of W's interest in H Trust (and
thus the section 2043(a) offset), provided the beneficiary can compel the trustee
"to make the trust corpus productive consistent with income yield standards for
trusts under applicable state law.,,139 This is so even if the state minimum yield
is "substantially below the section 7520 interest rate on the valuation date.,,'4o
b. The Marital Deduction.-In the above cases, we assumed
that H's executor did not make a QTIP election. That is often advisable where
W's life estate in H Trust is worth less value than the remainder she gave C in
her property. In that case, W has not received full consideration for her transfer,
section 2036 will apply, and W Trust (less the section 2043 offset) will be
included in W's gross estate. If H's executor makes a QTIP election, both the
portion of H Trust for which the election was made and W Trust (less the offset)
will be included in W's gross estate,141 and the resultant "bunching" will push up
the effective estate tax rate under the progressive rate schedule. On the other
hand, if H's executor does not make a QTIP election, these amounts will be split
between the two estates and may result in a lower aggregate tax. 142 A frequent

139. Regs. § 25.7520-3(b)(2)(v), ex. 2. See also supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
140. Regs. § 25.7520-3(b)(2)(v), ex. 2.
141. See IRC § 2044(a), (b)(l)(A) (property for which QTIP election was made is
included in surviving spouse's gross estate).
142. On the facts of Case 2, see supra pages 571-72, the decision of H's executor not
to make a QTIP election reduced the aggregate amount of taxes paid by the two estates. The
marginal tax rates for H's taxable estate ($1,000,000) and W's taxable estate ($1,100,000) were
39% and 41 % respectively. Had H's executor made a QTIP election, no tax would be due at H's
death, but the marginal tax rate on W's taxable estate (now increased to $1 ,450,000) would have
been 43%. These figures assume that H's executor made the QTIP election for only the portion
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reason for avoiding estate equalization is H's desire to maximize lV's income. 143
Where no QTIP election is made, estate tax will be due at H's death. thereby
diminishing the amount of principal available for generating income for lV.
However, this should be less of a concern if lV Trust is in the form of a GRAT
and W is therefore receiving an extraordinarily high return from that trust.
Moreover, equalizing the estates will often result in more wealth passing to the
next generation. 144
On the other hand, H's executor should make a QTIP election where lV's
life estate is worth more the remainder she gives to C, assuming the D'Ambrosio
trilogy holdings apply to spousal elections. Then section 2036 will not apply and
W Trust will not be included in lV's gross estate. In this situation. a QTIP
election provides the benefits of tax deferral without any offsetting
disadvantages. H's executor will be able to make a QTIP election so long as lV
is entitled to all of the income from H Trust. 14S This can be accomplished by
structuring H Trust either as a common law life estate or even as a GRAT,
provided in the latter case that lV is assured of the greater of the fixed annual
payout amount or the trust's income. l46 The size of the marital deduction,
however, will be reduced by the value of the remainder lV is required to give C
to obtain her life income interest in H Trust. 147
c. Emergency Needs ofW.-H may wish to guard against the
possibility of W's receiving too little, for example, where an unexpected
emergency occurs. H can achieve this objective without tax detriment by giving

of the H Trust not sheltered by the unified credit. and that H TnlSt, unlike lV TnlSt, did not
appreciate in value. If H TnlSt appreciates, the case for estate equalization is strengthened. The
effect of the credit for state death taxes was disregarded.
To achieve equalization ofthe estates, one must take into account various other factors
including the amount of noncommunity property owned by the respecti ve spouses, the rate of
growth in the value of W's property, and the maximum marital deduction that H's estate can
take under United States v. Stapf, 375 U.S. 118 (1963).
143. See, e.g., McDaniel et al., supra note 61, at 689 (listing as an advantage of
maximum tax deferral "provision ofa larger pool of assets specifically dedicated to the support
of the surviving spouse").
144. See id. at 688-89 ("[I]fthe aim is to maximize the amount passing to the next
generation and a constant rate ofgrowth is projected, equalization as a strategy may be the better
choice.").
145. IRC § 2056(b)(7) permits QTIP elections for property in which the survi\ing
spouse possesses a "qualifying income interest for life," which requires among other things that
the surviving spouse be "entitled to all the income from the property," payable at least annually
for life. IRC § 2056(b)(7)(B)(i), (ii).
146. See Regs. § 25.2702-3(b)(I)(iii) (paying the annuitant income in excess of the
fixed annuity payment does not disqualify the retained interest as a "qualified annuity interest:'
but the right to receive such excess is not considered in valuing such interest).
147. See United States v. Stapf, 375 U.S. 118, 127 (1963).
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the trustee a discretionary power to invade the principal of H Trust on W's
behalf. 148 He can also give Wa power to invade the principal of H Trust limited
to an ascertainable standard relating to her health, education, support or
maintenance. Although this is a "power of appointment," it is not a general
power of appointment. 149 Hence, W's release of the power will not be a taxable
gift nor will her retention of it until death cause H Trust to be included in W's
gross estate. ISO Although this type of power undoubtedly enhances the value of
W's interest in H Trust, it would normally not count in determining the value of
the consideration W received for purposes of the section 2043 offset or the
section 2036 exclusion, since a power that is contingent upon this type of future
unknown event (e.g., sickness) cannot be actuarially valued. 151
H can also give Wa noncumulative power to withdraw each year from
H Trust the greater of $5,000 or 5% of its principal (a "5 and 5 power"). W will
not be treated as making a taxable gift if she allows it to lapse. 152 However, any
amount W could have withdrawn at her death under an unlapsed power will be
included in her gross estate. 153 A 5 and 5 power can be actuarially valued. 154
Consequently, giving W this power in H Trust should increase the value of her
life estate, and hence the section 2043(a) offset, and also make it more likely that
W's estate will satisfy the "adequate and full consideration" exception to section
2036. 155
On the other hand, H should not give Wor the trustee any power over the
principal of H Trust. H should be particularly wary of giving W a power to

148. Sections 2036 through 2038 will not apply because W is not the "transferor" of
H Trust; Section 2041 will not apply because Whad no power over H TTl/sf at her death.

149. See IRC §§ 2041(b)(l)(A), 2514(c)(l).
150. Section 2514(b) treats only the exercise or release of a general power as a
"transfer" of property by the power holder, and § 2041 (a)(2) only includes in the gross estate
property over which the power holder held a general power at the time of his death.
151. Cf. Robinette v. Helvering, 318 U.S. 184 (1943). In Estate of Pardee v.
Commissioner, 49 T.C. 140 (1967), the court refused to value the effect of a divorce court's
continuing power to increase decedent's support obligation if the need arose, because any such
increase was "dependent upon a contingency beyond decedent's control." Id. at 149.
152. See IRC § 2514(e).
153. See IRC § 2041(a)(2).
154. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 79-211, 1979-2 C.B. 319 (value of decedent's 5 and 5
power, as determined "[o]n the basis ofrecognized actuarial principles," qualified for credit for
tax on prior transfers under § 2013(a)).
155. Professor Johanson asserts that a 5 and 5 power should not be counted in
computing the value of WTrust since there is no certainty that W will exercise it. See Johanson,
supra note 71, at 1301. This seems almost certainly wrong since the value of an interest is
measured by the powers it confers rather than the donee's subsequent decision whether to
exercise such powers. Thus, the holder of a "Crummey" power is treated as receiving a present
interest gift equal to the value of the property he could withdraw, even ifhe fails to exercise it.
See Crummey v. Commissioner, 397 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1968).
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invade the principal of W Trost which cannot be quantified (e.g., a power to
invade for W's happiness). Where such open-ended powers exist, lV may be
unable to establish that she has "transferred" any/hing to anybody. 156 Ifthere is
no transfer, then there is no "consideration," since there can be no consideration
for a transfer that never occurred. IS? lV's estate would not qualify for either the
section 2043 offset or the " bona fide sale" exclusion under section 2036, since
both these benefits depend upon there being a transfer for "consideration."lss
H should also avoid giving W even a quantifiable power to invade the
principal of W Trost for herself, such as a 5 and 5 power. Such a power will
reduce the value of W's transfer to C and therefore increase the likelihood that
W received full consideration for that transfer. On the other hand, release or even
a lapse of such a power will be a taxable gift to the extent of the amount released
(less any applicable annual exclusion).1S9 W's power is not a "power of
appointment" within the meaning of the gift and estate tax law, since lV, rather
than a third party, created the power. 100 Consequently, the exemption from gift
tax accorded by section 2514(e) to lapses of 5 and 5 powers created by others
does not apply!61

156. See Johanson, supra note 71, at 1302-11.
157. See Johanson, supra note 71, at 1302 ("In orderloqualify fora section 2(»3(a)
consideration offset, the wife must give something up in exchange for the interest she receives
from her husband"); see also Stephens et aI., supra note 123, at '14.08[711dl n.129 (IfWhas not
made a completed gift, "the bargain or exchange aspect of the widow's election seems to
disappear.").
158. If something in fact passes to the remaindennan at \V's death, it will be because
of W's post-election decision not to exercise her power of invasion. lV's receipt of a life estate
at the time ofher election therefore cannot have been the "consideration" or inducement for W's
subsequent decision not to invade. See Johanson, supra note 71, at 1303; cf. Robinson v.
Commissioner, 675 F.2d 774 (5th Cir.), cert denied 459 U.S. 970 (1982) (holding for gift ta~
purposes that W's receipt of a life estate in H Tmst at the time of her election was not
"consideration" for her subsequent release of a special power of appointment ovcr W Tmst).
159. W's retention of a 5 and 5 power over her property which passed into WTmst
makes her transfer incomplete to the extent she can revest the property in herself. Regs.
§ 25.2511-2(c); her relinquishment of that power "completes" the transfer making it subject to
the gift tax. Regs. § 25.2511-2(f); cf. Robinson, 675 F.2d at 777-78 (holding W's release of a
"special power of appointment" she had reserved over W TnlSt was a taxable gift).
160. Regs. § 25.2514-1(b)(2) (For gift tax purposes, "the teon 'powcr of appointment' does not include powers reserved by a donor to himself:'); Regs. § 20.2(» I-Hb)(2) (same
for estate tax); Robinson, 675 F.2d at 778.
161. cr. Robinson, 675 F.2d at 778-79, where the court observed that if W's power
to appoint trust principal amongH's and her children had not been created by W(for cxample,
if it had been granted by H to Wover H TnlSt), it would have been a special powcr of
appointment and its release would not be a taxable gifL). Howevcr, since it was a powcr \V
created over property she transferred to \V TnlSt, its releasc constituted hcr completion of a
taxable gift. Id.
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Moreover, any property subject to a power of withdrawal over W Trust
that W has not exercised or released by the time of her death will be included in
her estate under section 2038 as a power to "alter, amend, revoke or terminate"
exercisable at W's death. 162 Neither the section 2043(a) offset nor the section
2036 exclusion for "adequate and full consideration" will apply since W's receipt
of a life estate in H Trust at the time of her election cannot have been the
"consideration" or inducement for her subsequently-made decision not to
exercise the power. 163
Giving the trustee of W Trust a power to make discretionary payments
to W is also problematic. In many states, the settlor's creditors can satisfy their
claims out of trust property where the trustee can make discretionary payments
to the settlor l64 Since this effectively enables the settlor to enjoy the trust corpus
by incurring debts and then relegating her creditors to the trust, she is treated for
tax purposes as possessing a power to revest the trust property in herself. 165
Where this is the law, giving the trustee of W Trust a power to make
discretionary payments to W is the same as giving the power to Wand presents
the same problems as those discussed above.
Even where this is not the law, giving a discretionary power of invasion
to the trustee of W Trust may entail risks. One commentator has argued that no
section 2043 offset should be permitted, since there is no guarantee that the
remainderman will receive anything. 166 I disagree with this position, since W has
surrendered all power to deprive the remainderman of his interest and indeed has
made a completed gift for gift tax purposes. 167 Nevertheless, caution may advise
against giving the trustee discretionary power over the principal of W Trust even
here.

162. Section 2038(a)(I) provides that property which the decedent transferred after
June 22, 1936, will be included in his gross estate "where the enjoyment thereof was subject at
the date of his death to any change through the exercise of a power ... to alter, amend, revoke,
or terminate." See Robinson, 675 F.2d at 779 (dictum).
163. See authorities cited supra note 158.
164. See Ware v. GuIda, 117 N.E.2d 137 (Mass. 1954) (Massachusetts law).
165. See Outwin v. Commissioner, 76 T.e. 153 (1981).
166. Johanson, supra note 71, at 1309 ("If the trustee's discretionary power is so
broad that there is no assurance that anything of value will ever be received by the
remainderman, the wife has not made a transfer to which section 2043(a) should apply.").
167. See Rev. Rul. 77-378, 1977-2 C.B. 347. When Professor's Johanson's article,
supra note 71, was published, the Service had intimated in Rev. Rul. 62-13, 1962-1 e.B. 181,
that a trustee's broad discretionary power to invade trust property for the settlor's benefit, in and
of itself, rendered the settlor's transfer incomplete for gift tax purposes. In Rev. Rul. 77-378,
issued after ProfessorJohanson's article, the IRS clarified Rev. Rul. 62-13 by specifically stating
that a trustee's wholly discretionary power to benefit the settlor does not render the settlor's
transfer incomplete.
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4. The "Fly in the Ointment"-Uncerta;n Income Tax Effects.-The
present estate and gift tax treatment of a spousal election presupposes that Wand
H's estate are "exchanging" a remainder for a life estate (and vice versa) and
therefore raises the specter of there being a taxable "exchange" for income tax
purposes. Apparently, the Government has never asserted this position in a
litigated case, and no court has directly ruled on it. 163 Nevertheless, the
arguments for finding a taxable exchange are strong, and if successful, the
consequences would be severe.
a. Exchange Made by H's Estate.-One may question whether
H's estate has engaged in an exchange at all. Although H's estate has indubitably
transferred a life estate in H Trust to W, it has not received any property or goods
in return. 169 Moreover, H's offer of a life estate to W is almost always motivated,
at least in part, by a desire to benefit W as well as the remainderman C.
Arguably, therefore, the benefits conferred on Wand on C should both be viewed
as bequests. 170
Indeed, the Internal Revenue Service itself at one time viewed W as
receiving her interest in H Trust as a beneficiary under H's will rather than as a
purchaser. 17I It even rejected a request that the Regulations be amended to

168. Prior to the enactment of § 167(e). the courts held that \V oblained an amortizable "cost basis" in her life estate in H TnlSt equal to value of the remainder she surrendered
in her share of the conununity (or the value of the life estate she received. if less). Sec Gist v.
United States, 296 F. Supp. 526 (S.D. Cal. 1969). atrd. 423 F. 2d 1118 (9th Cir. 1970); see
Estate of Christ v. Conunissioner, 54 T.e. 493 (1970). atrd, 480 F.2d 171 (9th Cir. 1973); see
Kuhn v. United States, 392 F. Supp. 1229 (S.D. Tex. 1975). This conclusion was based on the
preInise that W"bought" her life estate by transferring a remainder in her share of the property
to C, see Kuhn at 1235-40-a preInise that necessarily implies that the estate had "sold" \V her
life estate in H Tn'S! in a taxable transaction. See Joseph 1'.1 Dodge, Retentions. Receipts.
Transfers, and Accumulations of Income and Income Rights: Ruminations on the Post-B}TUm
Role of Estate Tax Sections 2036, 2037, 2039 and 2043(a). 58 Tex. L Rev. 1,72 n.342 (1979)
("If there is a purchase, ... there must be a sale.") The IRS has never asserted this position and
no court has ever so held. Under current law, \V is prohibited from amortizing her basis in her
life estate, if, as almost always is the case. the remainderman is a related party. See IRC
§ 167(e).
169. See Dodge, supra note 83, at 293 n.220 ("But here. neither the decedent nor his
estate receives property or services.").
170. See id.
171. The IRS argued in Gist, 423 F.2d at 1120, and Kllhn. 392 F. Supp. at 1235-36.
that in a spousal election Wacquires her life estate in H TnlSt as "beneficiary" of H's \\ill rather
than as a "purchaser" (citing Helvering v. Butterworth. 290 U.S. 365 (1933». and thus has no
"cost basis" to amortize.
Professor Morrison supports this view arguing that treating \V as a "beneficiary"
achieves the objectives of the income tax law (i.e., "assurance that all income from estates and
trusts is taxed once, and only once; that the income is attributed to the proper ta"<payer; and that
ordinary income is not converted into capital gains") while avoiding the complications which
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include a statement to this effect on the ground the result was "too obvious ... to
warrant a specific statement."172 Nevertheless, the failure of the Service to
explicitly rule on this issue and the case law on related issues have led to a
continuing concern that a spousal election is a taxable event. 173
If it is, the election can probably best be understood by viewing H's
estate as "selling" a life estate in H Trust to W for a remainder interest in W
Trust, and then transferring the remainder to C as a bequest from H. If H had
directed his executors to sell Blackacre and give the proceeds to C, H's estate
would be taxed on any gain (at least if Blackacre were subject to estate
administration),174 while the payment of the proceeds to C would be treated as a
bequest. Similarly in this case, H's estate may be viewed as "selling" a life estate
in H Trust for the remainder in W Trust, and then transferring the "sale
proceeds" (i.e., the remainder) to Cas H's agent in carrying out his bequest. 175
The weakness in this analysis is its failure to recognize the donative
elements involved in a spousal election. Ultimately, proper income tax treatment
of a spousal election depends on its true nature-an issue discussed later in this
article.
If H' s estate is regarded as making a taxable exchange, the consequences
will be severe. The "amount realized" will be the value of C's remainder in W
Trust (or W's life estate in H Trust if less). 176 Since the life estate that H's estate

ensue when Wis treated as a "purchaser." Keith E. Morrison, The Widow's Election and its
Alternatives, 1971 Tex. Tech. Tax Inst. 141, 150 (1971).
172. Tech. Mem. 1971-7142 (July 30, 1971). The IRS rejected a request by a practitioner that the Regulations be amended to specifically provide that H's estate does not make a
"sale" of the life estate in H Trust for purposes of § 1001 (e) in a spousal election on the ground
that the rule sought "was too obvious, particularly in view of § 1.661(a)-2(t)(I), to warrant a
specific statement." Id. The Service's citation of this regulation, which deals with the income
tax treatment of estate and trust distributions to beneficiaries, was consistent with its then
position that Wtakes as a beneficiary and not a purchaser in a spousal election. The Service may
not be as firm in that view today. In the action-on-decision on Kuhn-which was decided after
Gist and Chlist-the Service stated it was reexamining the position it had "taken in widow's
election cases" and was considering publication of a revenue ruling on the subject. See Action
on Decision 1976-54 (Jan. 16, 1976). However, no ruling was ever issued.
173. See GaryC. Randall, Estate Planning and Community Property, 28 Idaho L. Rev.
807,831 (1992).
174. See IRC § 641(a)(3) (income received by estate during period of administration
taxable to estate). See Rev. Rul. 57-133, 1957-1 c.B. 200 (income from real property subject
to estate administration includible in estate's taxable income even though title vests
immediately in devisee).
175. Cf. Dodge, supra note 168, at 72 n.342 (H's estate, in making the exchange, is
acting as "an 'agent' executing the wishes of the decedent in carrying out a 'bequest' ").
176. The amount H's estate realizes is limited to the lesser of C's remainder in W
Trust or W's life estate in H Trust. If the value of the remainder W transfers in her property
exceeds the value of the life estate she receives, the excess is viewed as a "gift" from W to C
rather than additional consideration to H's estate. Conversely, if the value of W's life estate
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is "selling" is a term interest, the estate's basis in it will be zero by reason of
section 1001(e). 177 Thus, the estate will recognize gain on the "sale" equal to the
remainder's full value on the date of the "sale," i.e., the day of the election, 178 (or
the value of W's life estate on such day if less).179 If H's estate is treated as
selling a property interest, the gain will qualify for capital gain treatment. IW
More likely the estate will be treated as making an anticipatory sale of income
and will therefore recognize ordinary income under the teaching of
Commissioner v. P.G. Lake, Inc. lSI Rubbing salt into the wound, section 167(e)

exceeds the value of C's remainder in lV Tntst, the excess is treated as a bequest from H to W.
See Schwartz & Liker, supra note 131, at 10-22, 10-23; see Norman H. Lane, The Widow's
Election as a Private Annuity: Boon or Bane for Estate Planners, 44 S. Cal. L Rev. 74, 93
(1971).
The courts in Estate of Christ and Kuhll adopted this approach: they limited thc
amount of W's amortizable cost basis to the value of the life estate she received in H TnlSt and
treated the excess value of the remainder as a gift from lV to C. Estate of Christ v. Commissioner,54 T.e. 493, 530 (1970), aff'd,480 F.2d 171 (9th Cir. 1973); Kuhn v. United States, 392
F. Supp. 1229, 1239-40 (S.D. Tex. 1975). See also Dodge, supra note 168, at n n.342.
177. Section 1001(e) states that in determining gain or loss from the disposition of
a "term interest in property"-<!efined as either a term of years or a life estate in property or an
income interest in a trust-the portion ofthe adjusted basis ofsuch interest determined pursuant
to § 1014 shall be "disregarded," Le., treated as zero. IRC § 100I(e)(I), (e)(2). Thus, if a
spousal election is viewed as a taxable "sale," the estate's adjusted basis in the life estate it
conveys to lV will be zero since the basis of the property the estate received from H is
determined pursuant to § 1014. See IRC § 10I4(a), (b)(I).
178. In Estate ofChrist v. Commissioner, 480 F.2d 171, 173 (9th Cir. 1973), the court
held that the proper date for valuing lV's life estate in H TnlSt was ..the date of the distribution
to the trust and the date ... [lV's] election became irrevocable" rathcr than thc datc of H's
death.
179. See Lane, supra note 176, at 93.
180. See McAllisterv. Commissioner, 157 F.2d235 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. dcnicd, 330
U.S. 826 (1947); see Allen v. First Nat.' I Bank, 157 F.2d 592 (5th Cir. 1946) cert. dcnied, 330
U.S. 828 (1947); see Bell's Estate v. Commissioner, 137 F.2d 454 (8th Cir. 1943); see Rev. Rul.
72-243, 1972-1 C.B. 233 (IRS will follow McAllister).
181. 356 U.S. 260 (1958). Most commentators have concluded that if a spousal clcction is a taxable "exchange," P.G. Lake probably requires any resulting gain to be ta:~ed as
ordinaryincome. SeeJames J. Freeland et al., What are the income tax effects ofan estate's salc
of a life interest?, 34J. Tax'n 376,377 (1971); Schwartz & Liker, supra note 131, at 10-22 ("It
appears likely that ... the estate will be deemed to have realized ordinary income"); Dodge,
supra note 21, at A-91 (ordinary income treatment is the "more likely result"). Othcrs arc less
certain: see, e.g., Carol L Wilson, The Widow's Election Viewed in the Light of thc 1976 Tax
Reform Act and the 1975 California Probate Code Revision, 28 Hastings W. 1435, 1445 ( 1977)
("[N]o one is certain how the gain will be characterized"); Ralph Gano Miller Jr. and Philip P.
Martin Jr., Voluntary Widow's Election: Nation-Wide Planning for the Million Dollar Estate,
1 Calif. West. L Rev. 63, 78 (1965) (ordinary income treatment "possible, but not probablc").
Those arguing for ordinary income treatment note that whcre thc courts allowed
capital gain treatment (see McAllister, First Nat'[ Balik and Bel/'s Estate, supra notc 180), the
transferor had transferred all the interest he had. In contrast, in a spousal election, H's estate,
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will prevent W from amortizing her "cost basis" in her life estate in H Trust, if
W, as is almost always the case, is related to the remainderman. 182
b. Exchange Made by W.-If there is a taxable exchange, the
results should be nowhere near as calamitous to Was to H's estate. W should
realize little or no taxable gain, since her basis in her share of the community will
be "stepped-up" (or "stepped-down") to its fair market value on the date of H's
death (or alternate valuation date if applicable).183 In determining W's gain or
loss on the exchange, this basis will be allocated between the remainder and W's
retained life estate in W Trust based on their respective actuarial values on the
day of the exchangel84 The "amount realized" will be the value of the life estate
Wreceives in H Trust (or the value of C's remainder in W Trust ifless).185 W's
gain, if any, will therefore be the excess of the amount so realized over her
adjusted basis in the carved-out remainder and will be taxed as capital gain 186
Neither W nor H's estate nor H Trust will be able to recognize any loss
realized on the exchange since they are "related parties."187
The uncertain income tax consequences make a spousal election a risky
proposition. Tax planners may nonetheless wish to consider using it given the
lack of any direct authority holding that a taxable "exchange" has occurred and
in light of the technique's significant transfer tax advantages-particularly if the
D'Ambrosio trilogy has effectively overruled Gradow.

which starts out holding the entire fee interest, "carves out" and transfers only a part of its
interest to W, arguably making the situation more analogous to that found in P. G. Lake. An old
case allowed capital gain treatment where the owner of a fee interest carved out a legal life
estate, sold it to her husband and retained the remainder for herself. See Estate of Camden, 47
B.T. A 926 (1942), nonacq., 1943 C.B. 28, aff'd, 139 F.2d 697 (6th Cir. 1943). Its viability is
questionable in light of the Supreme Court's later decision in P. G. Lake. See Charles S. Lyon
& James S. Eustice, Assignment ofIncome: Fruit and Trees as Irrigated by the P.G. Lake Case,
17 Tax L. Rev. 295, 326 (1962).
182. A "related person" is any person who bears the same relationship to the taxpayer
as that described in § 267(b) or (e). IRC § 167(e)(5)(B). The disallowed amortization deductions
are added to the basis of the remainder interest. See IRC § 167(e)(3)(B).
183. Section 1014 provides that a surviving spouse's share ofthe community property
shall receive a new basis equal to property's fair market value as ofthe decedent's death (or the
alternate valuation date ifapplicable) ifat least one-half of the whole of the community interest
in such property is included in the decedent's gross estate. See IRC § 1014(a)(1)-(2), (b)(6).
184. See Rev. Rul. 77-413, 1977-2 C.B. 298. Section 1001(e) will not apply because
W is not selling a "term interest." IRC § 1001(e)(I), (2).
185. See supra note 176 for reason the amount realized is limited to the lesser of the
value of W's life estate in H TnlSt or C's remainder in W Trust and authorities so holding.
186. The Service recognizes that gain realized on the sale of a "carved-out" remainder
interest qualifies for capital gain treatment. See Hunter v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 109 (1965).
187. IRC § 267(a)(I), (b)(1), (b)(6), (b)(13).
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B. Searching for the True Nature ofa Spousal Election
The estate and gift tax consequences of a spousal election set out above
are disquieting. By using this technique, the surviving spouse may be able to
transfer her entire property (or a significant portion of it) to lower generation
beneficiaries without payment ofany estate or gift taxes. This defeats Congress's
intent that a married couple's property should be subject to transfer tax when it
passes to the next generation. 188 Presently the only judicially recognized barrier
to this result is the conceptually flawed position that only the full fee value of the
underlying property constitutes "adequate and full consideration" for the transfer
of a remainder interest.
Is there any theory, consistent with transfer tax doctrine and proper
valuation that can avoid this apparently unjustified tax benefit? The balance of
this article will consider three theories proposed by the commentators:
No Bona Fide Sale.-A spousal election is not a "bona fide sale," and
thus the exception to section 2036 does not apply.lS9
Mutual Gifts.-W's transfer of a remainder in her property to C, a
natural object of her bounty, is motivated by her love for C rather than in
"consideration" of a life estate in H Trust. Likewise, H's transfer of a life estate
in H Trust to W is induced by his love for W-not in "consideration" of W's
transfer of a remainder to C. Since this theory views H and W as each making
gifts of their own property in concert, it is sometimes called the "mutual gifts"
theory. 190
Reciprocal Trusts.-A spousal election creates reciprocal trusts and is
governed by the doctrine of the same name. 191
1. No "Bona Fide Sale. "-As noted above, current case law interprets
the phrase "adequate and full consideration" differently for the gift tax than it
does for the estate tax. In the case of the gift tax, W's transfer of a remainder to
C in her property is considered supported by full consideration if W's life estate
in H Trust merely equals the actuarial value of that remainder. 192 In contrast. the
Gradow line of cases holds that, for estate tax purposes, W's transfer of the
remainder to C is supported by full consideration only where W's life estate in
H Trust equals or exceeds the full value of the property passing into W Trust. 19)

188. See United States v. Stapf, 375 U.S. 118, 128 (1963) (Congress's purpose in
enacting the marital deduction was "to pennit a married couplc's property to be taxed in two
stages and not to allow a tax-exempt transfer of wealth into succeeding gencrations.-).
189. Jordan, supra note 58, at 716-23.
190. See Lowndes, supra note 21, at 69-71; Johanson, supra notc 71, at 1288-95.
191. Lowndes, supra note 21, at 76-81; Johanson, supra note 71, at 1288-95.
192. See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 14-16,22-25 and accompanying tcxt.

HeinOnline -- 4 Fla. Tax Rev. 585 1998-2001

586

Florida Tax Review

[Vol. 4:8

Professor Jordan has proposed an ingenious solution that reconciles the
results in these cases and at the same time prevents W's estate from escaping tax
on the disposition of her property. Professor Jordan notes that under section
2512(b), W can avoid gift tax if she merely receives "full consideration" on her
transfer of the remainder in W Tmst. However, to avoid inclusion of W Tmst in
W's gross estate, section 2036 requires not only that W receive "full
consideration," but also that she receive it in a "bona fide sale." This "additional
requirement" of a "bona fide sale" explains, according to Professor Jordan, why,
in the case of a spousal election, there can be estate tax liability (which requires
a "bona fide sale"), and at the same time, no gift tax liability (which does not). 194
Professor Jordan believes that a spousal election invariably produces a
result that is testamentary in nature. As a result of W's election, she retains
enjoyment of her property until death, while the transfer of her property upon her
death to the remaindermen-who almost always are her own issue--is "donative
in character."195 In contrast, a "bona fide sale" involves "an arm's length
exchange" where "both parties seek to receive value equal to that which they
surrender."I96 Professor Jordan summarizes her position as follows: "Ifproperty
is transferred in a transaction that is donative in character and the taxpayer
retains the benefits of the property until death, the property is included in the
taxpayer's gross estate even though adequate consideration was receivedfor the
remainder interest." 197
It is difficult to envision an exchange being "donative in character"
where the transferor obtains full value for her transfer. 198 Even were that
possible, it would not justify including the transferor's property in her gross
estate.
The universally recognized purpose of the "adequate and full
consideration" exception to sections 2036 through 2038 is to exclude transfers
that do not deplete the transferor's estate. 199 As Professor Jordan recognizes, if
the transferor receives "full consideration" for the transferred property, no
depletion occurs in the transferor's estate. 200 This is equally true whether the
transfer be deemed "donative in character" or not. Professor Jordan also

194. Jordan, supra note 58, at 716-18.
195. Id. at 717.
196. Id. at 718.
197. Id. at 717 (emphasis added).
198. Professor Jordan may envision a case where the transferor did not consciol/sly
seek to realize full value for her property but in fact received an objectively fair value. This is
interpretation consistent with her definition of an "arm's length exchange" as one in which
"both parties seek to receive value equal to that which they surrender." Id. at 718 (emphasis
added).
199. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
200. See Jordan, supra note 58, at 692-96.
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recognizes that requiring inclusion ofthe transferor's property in her gross estate
where she obtains "full consideration" in the exchange "creates double taxation"
(i.e., taxation of both the transferred remainder and the consideration received
therefor).201 Again this is equally true and equally unjust whether the transfer be
deemed "donative" or otherwise. In short, the policy reasons for excluding
transferred property where the transferor has received full value are equally valid
whether the transfer is "donative" or not, and both cases should be treated alike.
Professor Jordan apparently finds support for her position in a gift tax
regulation202 and Estate ofFriedman v. Commissioner. 203 But these authorities
merely hold that a transfer, which is bona fide, at arm's length and free from
donative intent, will be considered as made for "adequate and full
consideration," even should the IRS or a court later find the consideration
inadequate. They provide no support for the converse proposition that a
"donative" transfer is taxable even though made for "full and adequate
consideration." The rule in the gift tax regulations is designed to prevent bad
business bargains from being converted into taxable gifts.2(1.1 This policy is
simply irrelevant where adequate consideration is received.
The most likely purpose ofthe "bona fide sale" language in the exception
to section 2036 is exclude "sham" sales from its scope. 20S For example, a
transaction where the purported seller retains the benefits and burdens of
ownership of the property he purportedly sells will not qualify as a "bona fide
sale." The exchange occurring in a spousal election, however, is not a "sham,"
since it effects a real change in the rights of the parties (e.g., W surrenders all
interest in and power over the remainder in her property; the life estate in H Tmst
passes to W instead of another beneficiary).
The cases hold that a transfer not induced or motivated by the
transferee's reciprocal transfer but instead by a donative impulse does not qualify
for the exclusion in section 2036.206 But this does not explain the purpose of the
words "bona fide sale" since those words are not needed to reach this result. The
requirement that there be "consideration" is sufficient. A transfer not induced by
the transferee's reciprocal action is not made for "consideration." When used in
the law, the word "consideration" means that which induces or motivates the

201. lei. at 689-92.
202. Regs. § 25.2512-8.
203. 40 T.C. 714 (1963).
204. See 5 Boris L Bittker & Lawrence Lokken, Federal Taxation of Income, Estates
and Gifts lJI 121.4.5 (2d ed. 1993).
205. See Charles B. Lowndes et aI., Federal Estate and Gift Taxes '} 14.8 (3d. ed.
1974).
206. See Mollenberg's Estate v. Commissioner, 173 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1949); See
Giannini v. Commissioner, 148 F.2d 285 (9th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 730 (1945); see
Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Tait, 295 F. 429 (D.C. Md. 1923).
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other party's performance. 207 1f the "bona fide sale" language were needed to
impose this requirement, persons making simultaneous transfers of equal value
to each other would never owe a gift tax, even if such transfers were motivated
solely by donative impulses and without regard to the other's transfer, since
section 2512(b) contains no "bona fide sale" requirement. The value of one
transfer would always offset the value of the other. But this is not the law; there
is no offset unless one transfer is the "inducement" for the other. The word
"consideration" standing by itself achieves this result.
Judicial construction of the phrase "bona fide sale" and congressional
action support neither the meaning nor the significance Professor Jordan would
attribute to it. Courts have found transfers to be "bona fide sale[s]" even where
the transferor appeared motivated, at least in part, by donative impulses.208 In one
case, the decedent in "consideration" of his intended wife's release of her dower
rights established a trust providing income to the decedent for his life, then
income to his wife for her life, and then principal to certain beneficiaries. 209 This
transfer was donative in part, since one of the decedent's objectives was to
benefit his wife. As the court stated, the "evident intent of [the decedent] was to
make provision for [his intended wife], for his four children, and for the
management and disposition of his property free from the restraint of dower
rightS.,,21O Despite the presence of a donative intent, the court found the transfer
to be a "bona fide sale.,,211

207. The Second Restatement ofContracts states that something constitutes "consid·
eration" only if it is "bargained for," that is, that "it is sought by the promisor in exchange for
his promise and is given by the promisee in exchange for that promise." Restatement (Second)
of Contracts § 71 (1979). The comments add that "in the typical bargain, the consideration and
the promise bear a reciprocal relation of motive or inducement: the consideration induces the
making of the promise and the promise induces the furnishing of the consideration." Id., cmt.
b. See also Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Common Law 230 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1963)
("[I]t is the essence of a consideration, that ... it is given and accepted as the motive or
inducement of the promise"). For this reason, a promise made after an action has already been
performed is not consideration for that action, since the action was not indl/ced by the
subsequently-made promise. See E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts § 2.7 (3d ed. 1999).
In Giannini v. Commissioner, 148 F.2d 285 (9th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 730
(1945), the court adopted this concept of "consideration" as something "bargained for" in
holding that the "adequate and full consideration" exception did not apply. The court held that
decedent's transfer to a trust in which the decedent was an income beneficiary was not in
"consideration" of his parents' simultaneous transfer to the trust, since the parents' transfer
"resulted ... not from bargaining, but from ... [their] largess." Id. at 287.
208. See Ferguson v. Dickson, 300 F. 961, 962 (3d Cir. 1924); see McCaughn v.
Carver, 19 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1927).
209. See Ferguson, 300 F. at 962.
210. See id. at 962.
211. See id. at 963.
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Congress has legislatively overruled these "dower" cases. What is
significant is the way it did so. Congress accomplished its objective-not by
changingthe "bonafide sale" requirement-but by modifying the "consideration"
requirement: first by substituting the phrase"adequateand full consideration" for
the phrase "fair consideration"212 and then by expressly providing that a release
of dower or curtesy rights did not constitute "a consideration in 'money or
money's worth.",213 In short, Congress was not concerned that donative-tinged
transactions were considered "bona fide sale[s]" but rather that they were found
to be supported by sufficient "consideration."
Professor Jordan makes many telling points when she argues as a matter
of policy that the surviving spouse's property in a spousal will election should
be included in her gross estate. 214 However, this result cannot be achieved by
relying on the requirement of a "bona fide sale."
2. A Spousal Election as Mutual, But Separate, Gifts by Hand W.-In

some cases, a spousal election may simply carry out the dispositive plans that
each spousehad already individually decided upon. Where this is true, it is wrong
to say that H and Ware exchanging property in "consideration" of each other's
transfer, since their respective transfers are not induced by the reciprocal transfer
of the other. They are merely doing what they would have done in any event.
Where this is the case, neither W nor her estate should be allowed any of the
offsets or exclusions provided for under sections 2512(b), 2043, and 2036. These
provisions apply when a transferor receives "consideration" for his transfer. In
tax law, substance prevails over form and the amounts the transferor receives
must be real "consideration," that is, they must be the actual "inducement" or
"motivation" for her transfer. 2lS If her transfers are in fact "gifts" she would have

212. Merrill v. Fahs, 324 U.S. 308, 312 (l945). Since courts had held lhat "'fair
consideration' included the relinquishment ofdower rights," Congress was "led ... to substitute
in the 1926 Revenue Act, the words 'adequate and full consideration.' . . . Congress
undoubtedly intended the requirement of 'adequate and full consideration' to exclude
relinquishment ofdower and other marital rights." Id. at312. See also Commissioner v. Bristol,
121 F.2d 129 (lst Cir. 1941) and Empire Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 94 F.2d 307 (4th Cir.
1938) (holding that the "adequate and full consideration" language required lhat property the
decedent had transferred in exchange for release of his spouse's marital rights be included in
his gross estate).
213. Revenue Act of 1932, Pub. L. No. 72-54, ch. 209, § 804,47 Stat. 169,280
(1932) (amending the Revenue Act ofl926, ch, 27, § 303(d), 44 Stat. 9, 73 (1926». However,
the courts held that this change was merely declaratory of what the law had been under the
"adequate and full consideration" language and that Congress had acted out of an excess of
caution. See Commissioner v. Bristol, 121 F.2d at 135; see Empire Trust Co. v. Commissioner,
94 F.2d at 309-10.
214. See Jordan, supra note 58, at 720-23.
215. See supra notes 206-07 and accompanying text.
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made in any event, then she did not make the transfers in "consideration" of the
other party's transfer, and no offset or exclusion is allowed.
Where this analysis applies, the tax consequences of a spousal election
are as follows: W's establishment of W Trust constitutes a completed gift of a
remainder to C. Since Cis W's child, section 2702 will apply and W will be
taxed on the entire value of the property placed in W Trust unless her interest is
a qualified interest. Since W's transfer of the remainder to C was not induced by,
or put differently, was not made in "consideration" of her receiving a life estate,
neither the exception under section 2036 nor the offset under section 2043 will
apply. This analysis may also solve the income tax problem: since W's transfer
of a remainder to C was not made in an "exchange" but rather as a "gift," there
is no taxable event. 216
The weakness of the foregoing analysis is its failure to recognize the
amount of real bargaining and even coercion often involved in spousal elections.
The above analysis implicitly assumes that each party would have made their
transfers irrespective of what the other did. In fact, the election posed to Wexerts
real pressure on W-amounting in some cases to coercion-to allow her property
to pass in a manner different from what she would normally prefer. Left to her
own druthers, W would usually prefer to retain ownership of her property
outright rather than place it in W Trust. There are two reasons for this: W would
want to maintain her ability to invade the principal of her property at will should
the need or desire arise, and secondly, W would like to retain until death her
ability to determine how her property will pass. 217 The hard fact is that the choice
given to Win H's will-either let her property pass under H's will or else forgo
all benefits in his estate-frequently "coerces" or "locks in" W to a disposition
she would prefer to defer and one that she might ultimately decide not to make.
Indeed, H may have used the election will format precisely because of
its coercive effect. For example, H might use the device to assure himself that W
leaves her property to his child C. 218 This would be especially true if Wand Care
estranged, or if C is H's child by a prior marriage. H may also be concerned that
W will remarry and make provision for her new spouse to the prejudice of their
children's interest. H might employ the spousal election will model because he

216. See IRe §§ 102 (a), 1001(a); see Boris I. Bittker & Martin J. McMahon, Jr.,
Federal Income Taxation of Individuals err 28.3 (2d ed. 1995) (gift of appreciated property is
nontaxable event).
217. See Dodge, supra note 168, at 66-68; see also Morrison, supra note 21, at 226
n.21 (describing as "untenable" the argument that Wwould have made the same transfer even
if no spousal election since lV, by making the election, "makes a definite decision which she
might otherwise postpone until her death with all the intervening uncertainties.").
218. See Johanson, supra note 71, at 1264. By restricting W's interest to an income
interest in the entire community estate, H can assure that it will pass to couple's children
"without undue dissipation."
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is concerned about W's spendthrift proclivities and therefore wants to limit her
ability to spend principal.219 Or H might be concerned about W's lack ofbusiness

and financial experience and therefore want her property to be held in a trust
where a professional trustee will manage it.220 Likewise, H may believe that the
nature of the community property (e.g., a closely held business) requires unified
management.221
Given the strong desire of most surviving spouses to retain the control
over both the use and disposition of their principal until death, the "mutual gift"
approach should be used in only extreme cases. Before invoking this approach,
the IRS should be required to show by a preponderance of the evidence that W
would have set up a trust having the same dispositive provisions as W Tn/st even
if there had been no spousal election, and further that she would done so shortly
after H's death. Professor Dodge has suggested that this showing is likely only
where W was infirm, bordering on incompetency, or quite wealthy at the time of
H's death. 222 Otherwise, it is quite likely that the offer of a life estate in H Tn/st
did in fact induce W to let her property pass under H'swill. 223
3. A Spousal Electioll as the Creation ofReciprocal Tn/sts

a. The Rationale of the Reciprocal Trust Doctrine.-Several
commentators have argued that spousal will elections come within the purview
ofthe reciprocal trust doctrine. 224 In my opinion, these commentators have failed
to convincingly explain why the doctrine should apply. Their use of the doctrine
seems little more than invoking a doctrine to reach a desired result. To determine
the propriety of applying the doctrine, we must first understand its rationale.

219. See Johanson, supra note 71, at 1264.
220. See id. (stating that H may want to "protect his wife ... against imprmident
investments or bad advice from relatives"). See also Wilson, supra nOle 181, at 1436 tprmiding
a comprehensive list of nontax. reasons for using the spousal election will format).
221. See Johanson, supra note 71, at 1264; Wilson, supra note 181, at 1436.
222. See Dodge, supra note 168, at 69.
223. Professor Dodge suggests this approach may be used where H and W join in
setting up an inter vivos trust which provides that one-half ofthe income be paid to each during
their joint lives, then income to the survivor, then remainder to C. Since \Yhas no assurance of
receiving any additional benefits under this arrangement (because she may predecease HJ, her
inter vivos commitment to "an arrangement that provides her no certain benefits, current or
future, smacks of a simple gratuitous transfer by" lV, effectivc upon H's death, of a remainder
to C. See Dodge, supra note 168, at 69-70. However, cvcn herc, lYmay simply be responding
to the coercion by H: H may have told lV that unless she joined in the sctting up of the trust, he
would exclude her from his will. In at least some marriages, husbands can exert more coercion
over their wives while alive than dead.
224. See Lowndes, supra note 21, at 76-77; Lowndes et al., supra note 205, § 9.8, at
195-96; Johanson, supra note 71, at 1288-95.
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The doctrine is generally recognized as having originated in Lehman v.
Commissioner. 225 The decedent and his brother set up trustS. 226 The trusts
established by decedent provided that income was to be paid to his brother for
life, authorized his brother to withdraw $150,000 from the trusts, and directed
that principal be paid to his brother's issue upon his brother's death. 227 His
brother's trusts contained reciprocally identical provisions, that is, they provided
that income be paid to decedent for life, authorized decedent to withdraw
$150,000 from the trusts, and directed that principal be paid to decedent's issue
upon the decedent's death. 228 Ruling in favor of the Commissioner, the court held
the trusts purportedly created by decedent's brother were in substance created by
decedent. 229 The court cited Scott on Trusts that "[a] person who furnishes the
consideration for the creation of the trust is the settlor, even though in form the
trust is created by another.,,230 It ruled that "the transfer by decedent's brother,
having been paid and bought for by the decedent, was in substance a 'transfer'
by the decedent."231 Consequently, the $150,000 that the decedent could
withdraw from the trust nominally created by his brother was included in his
gross estate as that part of decedent's "transfer" over which he retained a power
"to alter, amend, or revoke.,,232
The effect of the doctrine, when it applies, is to "uncross" or "switch"
grantors. 233 Thus, in Lehman the decedent was treated as creating the trust
nominally created by his brother, and his brother was treated as creating the trust
nominally created by the decedent. The underlying rationale of the theory is that
the decedent has created a trust nominally created by another, since he "paid and
bought for" it by setting up a reciprocal trust for that other person's benefit.

225. 109 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 637 (1940).
226. See id. at 100.
227. See id.
228. See id.
229. See id.
230. See id.
231. Lehman v. Commissioner, 109 F.2d 99,100-01 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 310
U.S. 637 (1940).
232. Id. at 101. Although the decedent retained a life income interest in the trusts he
was deemed to have created, the full principal of the trusts was not included in his gross estate
as transfers "intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after [decedent's] death,"
id., since those trusts were created before the enactment of the Joint Resolution of March 3,
1931, H.R.J. Res. 529, 71stCong., 3d Sess., 46 Stat. 1516 (1931), which amended § 302(c) of
the Revenue Act of 1926, 44 Stat. 9,70 (1926), and overruled May v. Heiner, 281 U.S. 238
(1930). See id. and supra note 1.
233. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 74-533, 1974-2 C.B. 293; Bischoff's Estate v. Commissioner, 69 T.e. 32 (1977); Exchange Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 694 F.2d 1261 (Fed Cir.
1982). But see Estate of Green v. United States, 68 F.3d 151, 153 (6th Cir. 1995) (court,
assuming arguendo that trusts were "interrelated," refused to "uncross" grantors because
grantors did not retain an economic benefit in the transferred property).
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In United States v. Estate of Grace, the Supreme Court rejected the
contention that the Government needed to show, before invoking the doctrine,
that each trust was the "bargained-for quid pro quo" for the other.:!..'4 The
Government merely had to show that the trusts were "interrelated" (for example,
that they were created at about the same time, were set up pursuant to a common
plan, and had similar terms), and that their creation "to the extent of mutual
value, leaves the settlors in approximately the same objective economic position
as they would have been in if each had created his own trust with himself, rather
than the other, as life beneficiary."23s
The Grace decision leaves the underlying rationale orjustification for the
reciprocal trust doctrine in doubt. 236 Arguably, Grace rejected the Lehman
rationale and replaced it with a "net effect" rationale. Under this interpretation,
each party is treated as the creator of the trust nominally established by the other,
simply because each party is in the same position he would have been had he in
fact set up the other trust. In other words, since the transaction had the same "net
effect" as one covered by section 2036, it should be treated in that manner.
A less sweeping interpretation of Grace is that it relaxes or eases the
evidentiary burden needed to invoke the doctrine for practical and administrative
reasons but leaves unaltered the underlying justification for the doctrine. The
Court noted that requiring a finding that each trust was created as the quid pro
quo for the other would necessitate "perilous" inquiries into the subjective intent
of the parties where at least one of them, and possibly both, are deceased, and
where the transaction may have occurred many years before. 237 The Court noted
the difficulty of showing subjective intent in intrafamily transactions where the
parties rarely bargain in the same conscious, explicit manner that business people
do. 238 The Court also observed the high probability that such transactions were
tax-motivated.239 I prefer this view of Grace, but some of the language in the
decision points in the other direction.
Grace did not adopt a "pure" net effect rationale, since the Court also
required that the two trusts be "interrelated. ,,2-10 Apparently, the doctrine does not
apply if two people-\vithout knowledge of the other's intent or
actions-separately create trusts naming the other as income beneficiary, since
such trusts would not be viewed as "interrelated."w It is difficult to justify this

234. 395 u.s. 316, 324 n.9 (1969).
235. See id.
236. See discussion of this issue in Lowndes et al., supra note 205, at § 9.8.
237. Estate ofGrace, 395 U.S. at 323.
238. See id. at 324.
239. See id. at 323.
240. 1d. at 324.
241. The dissenting opinion in the Court of Claims in Grace, alluding to O. Hcnry's
"Gift ofthe Magi," stated that the reciprocal trust doctrine would nor apply "evcn if the chance
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result under the net effect rationale, since the settlors are just as much in the
same economic position as if each had created a trust naming himself as income
beneficiary. Moreover, the "net effect" rationale seems to conflict with case law
holding that taxpayers are not required to structure transactions in a manner
producing the highest possible tax. 242 The fashion in which taxpayers structure
their transactions is normally respected for tax purposes so long as it has
substantive economic effect. 243 The creation of reciprocal trusts would certainly
have economic substance in some cases. For example, the establishment of
reciprocal trusts with significantly different investments would appear to have
economic substance since it markedly changes the nature of the investments from
which each grantor derives his income.244
Still the Supreme Court's rationale in Grace remains unclear. I contend,
however, that regardless of how one interprets Grace, the Lehman rationale
provides the only proper basis for applying the reciprocal trust doctrine in the
context ofspousal elections. While Grace may have broadened the rationale for
applying the reciprocal trust doctrine, the Court recognized that the Lehman
rationale of bargained-for consideration is still a valid justification for applying

effect of ... independent transfers is to leave [the transferor] in the exact situation he would
have been in had he transferred his property retaining an interest or power similar to that
granted by his benefactor." 393 F.2d 939, 952 (Ct. C1. 1968) (Judges Davis and Nichols
dissenting), rev'd, 395 U.S. 316 (1969). The Supreme Court cited this dissenting opinion with
approval but not specifically on this point. See Lehman, 395 U.S. at 322. It has been stated that
"[p]resumably, the requirement that the trusts be 'interrelated' would preclude, as it should, an
application of the doctrine where two settlors quite unknowingly and coincidentally happened
to create similar trusts for each other." Stephens et aI., supra note 123, at 1J14.08[7][d] n.137.
242. See Gregory v. Helvering, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934), affd, 293 U.S. 465
(1935). It was stated by Judge Learned Hand that "Anyone may so arrange his affairs that his
taxes shall be as low as possible; he is not bound to choose the pattern which will best pay the
Treasury...." Id. at 810.
243. See David P. Hariton, Sorting Out the Tangle of Economic Substance, 52 Tax
Law. 235 (1999). The author states that tax-motivated transactions will be respected under this
principle so long as they "meaningfully alter the taxpayer's economic position (apart from their
tax consequences) as compared to not undertaking them." Id. at 241. Even where they lack
economic substance, they will respected unless the "tax benefits themselves are unreasonable
and unwarranted in light of the objective rules which give rise to them." Id.
In Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Smith, 356 U.S. 274 (1958), the Supreme Court
respected the form of a transaction for estate tax purposes which had minimal, if any, economic
substance apart from reducing estate tax. The decedent purchased combined life insuranceannuity contracts where any loss of the issuer on the life insurance contracts would be
counterbalanced by its gain on the annuity contracts. The decedent irrevocably assigned the
insurance policies. Although the net effect of the transaction was the same as if decedent had
retained a life income interest in the total amount paid for the combined contracts, the Court
refused to apply the predecessor of § 2036, since the policies and the annuities were separate
items of property. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co., 356 U.S. at 280.
244. Cf. Cottage Savings Ass'n. v. Commissioner, 499 U.S. 554 (1991).
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the doctrine in cases having theappropriate facts. 24S More importantly, unlike the
facts in Grace, a court in a spousal election case cannot ignore W's subjective
intent and decide the case solely on the basis of the transaction's net effect. In
such cases, W's estate is claiming either an offset or an exclusion on the ground
that W received "consideration" for her transfer of the remainder in her property
to c.246 The courts have properly held that for the taxpayer to prevail the
purported consideration must be the actual "inducement" or "motivation" for W's
transfer. 247 Consequently, the court must necessarily pass upon W's intent in
establishing W Trust. If W's estate establishes that lV transferred a remainder in
her property to C solely to obtain a life estate in H Trust, the court must allow
the offset or the exemption, since this result is statutorily mandated. This is so
even if the transfers are interrelated; indeed, it is so because they are interrelated,
that is, because W's transfer was induced by her receipt of a life estate in H
Trust.
If the court finds that lV's establishment of W Trust was unaffected by
the election, that is, that she would have established a trust similar to W Trust at
or about the time of the election in any event, the court will deny the offset and
the exclusion. 2-l8 However, as we have seen, this will rarely be the case. 249
If-as is more likely to be the case-the court finds that W would not
have established W Trust at that time but for the election, must it then allow the
offset or exclusion? In this situation, the Lehman rationale provides the proper
conceptual tool for analysis. Application of this approach will usually, though
not always, result in disallowance of both the offset and the exclusion.
b. The Lehman Rationale Applied to Spousal
Elections.-Lehman applies a "unitary" approach to the creation of reciprocal
trusts, that is, it views each party as creating the entirety ofthe other party's trust
and not just the portion that personally benefits him. 250

245. United States v. Estate of Grace, 395 U.S. 316, 324 n.lO (1969) ("We do not
mean to say that the existence of "consideration" ... can never be relevant. In cenain cases,
inquiries into the settlor's reasons for creating the trusts may be helpful in establishing the
requisite link between the two trusts.").
246. See IRe §§ 2512(b), 2036(a) (parenthetical expression). and 2Q.13(a).
247. See supra notes 206-07 and accompanying text.
248. See supra Pan N.B.2.
249. See id.
250. One consequence of the unitary approach is that where the reciprocal trust
doctrine applies, the amount included in the decedent's gross estate is determined by reference
to the value ofthe propeny in the trust nominally created by the other transferor. See Rev. Rut
74-533, 1974-2 c.B. 293. Professor Dodge argues that one might logically apply the doctrine
by treating the decedent as transferring his own trust but "retaining" his interest or power in the
other trust. Under such an approach. the amount includible in decedent's gross estate would be
determined by reference to the date-of-death value of the trust he purponed to create. See
Dodge, supra note 21, at A-60 to A-6l. He concludes, however, that the approach used (Le., the
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In Lehman itself, for example, the court viewed the decedent as creating
not only those portions of his brother's trust that personally benefited him (i.e.,
his life estate and his power to withdraw $150,000) but also the portion of his
brother's trust that benefited decedent's issue (Le., the remainder). Assuredly this
is correct. The brother did not give the remainder in his property to decedent's
issue because of his love for them; he gave it because the decedent had
reciprocally given a remainder in his property to the brother's issue. 251
In contrast to the reciprocal trust doctrine, the courts in analyzing
spousal elections apply a "fragmented" approach. H is not viewed as causing W
to create the entirety of W Trust but rather as inducing her to relinquish only the
remainder. 252 I contend that the "unitary" approach of the reciprocal trust
doctrine better captures reality in most spousal elections than the "fragmented"
approach currently used.
What H is attempting to do by giving W an election is to induce W to
dispose of her property in a comprehensive manner that will benefit not only C
but also W herself. After all, H's donative feelings run to W as well as to C. It
is contrary to our knowledge of human relationships to assume, as the current
approach does, that H is offering the election solely to benefit C. Indeed, H may
desire W to place her property in trust and to limit her interest to that of an
income beneficiary out of genuine concern for W. Although most people today
may regard such concerns as paternalistic, if not sexist, they may nevertheless
represent H's honest feelings of concern and affection for W. H may be
concerned about W's lack of business and financial experience, and may
therefore want to induce her to place her property in trust where an experienced,
professional trustee will manage it. 253 H may be concerned that given W's lack
of experience in managing property, she might imprudently consume principal
to her own disadvantage, and therefore limit her interest to that of an income
beneficiary.254 In any event, H is seeking to have W commit herself to dispose of
her property in a manner benefiting herself as well as C. If H were solely

"unitary" approach) "derives from the broader indirect-transfer principle that causes the trust
to be includible in the first place," Le., the principle that the decedent has indirectly funded the
other trust. Id. at A-61.
251. Similarly, the court in Commissioner v. Warner, 127 F.2d 913 (9th Cir. 1942),
applied the reciprocal trust doctrine where each of three brothers purported to create a trust for
family members of a different brother. Thus, Jack Warner was treated as the grantor of a trust
nominally created by his brother Albert for the benefit of Jack's family, since simultaneously
Jack had created a trust for the benefit of his brother Harry's family and Harry had created a
trust for the benefit of Albert's family. See id. at 915.
252. See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
253. See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
254. See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
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concerned with C, he could have accomplished his objective more effectively
simply by leaving his property outright to C.
H is seeking a "package deal" from W. H is attempting to secure this
package from Wby offering her in turn a package she finds attractive. In making
her decision, W will be influenced not only by the enticement of a life estate in
HTrust, but also by the way Hultimately disposes of his property. Certainly this
is the case where the life estate W receives is worth less than the remainder she
surrenders. Then W will be sustaining an economic loss by allowing her property
to pass under H's will and will not rationally do so unless she derives a psychic
benefit from H's leaving a remainder interest to C. Even where the life estate
offered W is worth more than the remainder she must surrender, W will rarely be
indifferent to how the property in H Trust ultimately passes. W may very well be
unwilling to give up access to her principal and her ability to determine how her
property will pass at death, unless she is happy with H's designation of the
remainderman. 255 If H left the remainder in his property to his mistress who was
25 years younger than W, W will be loathe to allow her property to pass under
H's will no matter what the value of her income interest in H Trust.
The "unitary" approach-which recognizes that H is offering W a
"package deal" in H Trust in return for a "package deal" in W Trust-better
reflects reality than the "fragmented" approach-which views H and W as just
undertaking an exchange of a life estate for a remainder. The reciprocal trust
doctrine therefore properly applies to most spousal elections. H is inducing W to
dispose of her property in a certain way (Le., creating W Trust) by disposing of
his property in a certain way (i.e., creating H Trust). Put more crudely, His
"buying and paying for" W Trust by his establishment of H Trust, and
conversely, W is "buying and paying for" H Trust by allowing her property to
pass under H's will. H should therefore be treated as the grantor of W Trust and
Was the grantor of H Trust.
Unlike the "mutual gift" theory, this approach recognizes both the
bargaining and donative aspects that usually co-exist in an election: It recognizes
that W's decision to allow her property to pass under H's \vill was partially
induced by the prospect of receiving a life estate in H's property (the bargaining
aspect), but it also recognizes that W's decision was partially induced by H's
designation of C-her child-as remainderman (the donative aspect).
This approach resolves the appropriate gift tax treatment of the transaction. Since W is viewed as the grantor of H Trust, she should be treated as
making a gift of the remainder in that trust to C.256 Since the remainderman. C,

255. See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
256. The IRS uses the "fragmented" rather than the "unitary" approach in determining gift tax liability. See Rev. Rul. 69-505. 1969-2 C.B. 179. Assume A creatcs A Tntst. with
income payable to B for life, remainder to C, and B. in an interrelated transaction. creates B

HeinOnline -- 4 Fla. Tax Rev. 597 1998-2001

598

Florida Tax Review

[Vol. 4:8

is her child, section 2702 will apply, and unless W retains a "qualified interest"
in H Trust, she should be treated as making a gift of the entire value of that trust.
This approach differs fundamentally from existing law, where both the
courts and the IRS permit W to offset her gift of a remainder in W Trust by the
value of the life estate she receives in H Trust. 257 There is a section 2512(b)
consideration offset in the transaction, but it is different from the one recognized
by the courts and the IRS. To understand this, we must once again delve into the
conceptual foundations of the reciprocal trust doctrine.
Consider this case: A transfers Blackacre in trust with income payable
to B for life, remainder to B's issue, and B, in an "interrelated" transaction,
transfers Whiteacre in trust with income payable to A for life, remainder to A's
issue. Under the reciprocal trust doctrine, B is treated as the real grantor of A's
trust; B is therefore viewed as transferring Blackacre. How can this be when
Blackacre belonged to A? The answer is that the reciprocal trust doctrine
necessarily requires that A and B be viewed as first exchanging beneficial
interests in Blackacre and Whiteacre. The reciprocal trust doctrine, properly
analyzed, involves two constructive steps: The two parties first exchange
beneficial interests in their respective properties, and each party subsequently
transfers the property he physically holds (but which now beneficially belongs
to the other) as the other party's agent. In terms of the above example, A and B
first exchange their beneficial interests in Blackacre and Whiteacre. A then
transfers Blackacre (which he now holds on B's behalf) as B's agent; and B
transfers Whiteacre (which he now holds on A's behalf) as A's agent.
The following example may clarify this point. Assume Downs
Greenacre having a fair market value of $500,000. If D accepts $500,000 from
E in consideration for transferring Greenacre, at E's behest, to a trust for the
benefit of E and E's issue, D in effect has sold Greenacre to E for $500,000, and

Trust, with income payable to A for life, remainder to C. Rather than treating A as the grantor
of B Trust and B as the grantor of A Trust for gift tax purposes, the Service bifurcates the
transaction. First, A and B are treated as exchanging their respective life estates in the two
trusts. Thus A makes a taxable gift to B to the extent, if any, that the value of B's life estate in
A Trust exceeds the value of A's life estate inB Trust; B's gift, if any, is determined in the same
manner. Then each party is treated as making a gift of the remainder in the trust he or she
purportedly created (i.e., A is treated as making a gift of the remainder in A Trust). See id.
This approach is inconsistent with the approach the IRS uses for estate tax purposes.
See Rev. RuI. 74-533, 1974-2 C.B. 293. If the gift tax approach were followed, the IRS would
include the value of A Trust inA 's gross estate under § 2036, since the gift tax approach viewed
A as having transferred the remainder in A Trust. However, the Service bases the amount
included in A's gross estate solely on the value of B Trust. See id. The Service's gift tax
approach is also inconsistent with the underlying rationale for applying the reciprocal trust
doctrine, that is, that each transferor is the grantor of the other party's trust. See supra note 250
and accompanying discussion.
257. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
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then, acting as E's agent, transferred Greellacre to the trust. This is what
happens when the reciprocal trust doctrine applies.
In the context of a spousal election, W should thus be viewed as first
exchanging ownership of her share of the community for ownership of H's share
of the community.258 W should then be viewed as transferring her share of the
community, which she now holds on behalf of H's estate, to W Trust as the agent
for H's estate. Likewise, H's estate should be viewed as transferring H's share
of the community to H Trust as W's agent, thereby making W the grantor of that
trust. The section 2512(b) gift tax consideration offset applies to the fIrst
constructive step-W's exchange of her beneficial interest in her share of the
community for H's share of the community. Wrealizes no gift tax liability on this
constructive "exchange" because the values of the properties being exchanged are
equal.259 Since W fully utilizes the consideration she receives as an offset in the
first constructive step, she may not use it again in the second constructive step.
Thus, W is not entitled to any offset in her deemed creation of H Trust.
Since W is viewed as the grantor of H Trust in which she has retained
a life estate, the entire value of H Trust will be included in her gross estate under
section 2036. The consideration W received in the election was not for her
deemed creation of H Trust but rather in the constructive exchange of her share
of the community for H's share of the community. Consequently, neither the
section 2036 exclusion nor the section 2043 offset will apply.2t,o

258. Some have asserted that the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Stapf,
375 U.S. 118 (1963), validates current law, which views a spousal election as an "exchange"
by Wof a remainder in her property for a life estate in H's property. See Morrison, supra note
21, at 226-27. Indeed, the decision seems to implicitly assume that a spousal election involves
an "exchange" between Wand H's estate. See Lowndes, supra note 21, at 73-74 (the Court of
Appeals "apparently considered the widow's election a transfer for consideration" and the
Supreme Court "without close analysis ofthe issue, seems to have made the same assumption");
Morrison, supra note 21, at 226 (Stapfrecognired the "validity of intraspousal transfers and
exchanges."). But the existence of an "exchange" is fully consistent with the reciprocal trust
doctrine, since the doctrine likewise assumes an "exchange," namely, an exchange of W's share
of the community for H's share of the community (i.e., the first constructive step).
259. In many cases, lV's share of the community will be larger than H's share, since
death taxes and administration expenses will have depleted his share. In that case. the amount
of lV's property that she is treated as exchanging for the creation of H TmSf is limited to the
value of H Trost, and the excess amount in WTmst will be treated as a transfer by \V resulting
in a gift. Grace limits application ofthe reciprocal trust doctrine to the "extent of mutual value"
transferred by the parties, i.e., the smaller amount United States v. Estate of Grace, 395 U.S.
316,324 (1969). See also supra note 176.
260. Although a definitive answer of this question is beyond the scope of this article,
use of the reciprocal trust doctrine may also rcsolve the income tax treatment of a spousal \\ill
election. Since the values of \V's share and H's share that are exchanged for each other are
equal, and since each ofthese shares acquires the same basis, that is. their values on the day of
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However, there will be cases where the "fragmented" approach of the
current law better fits the facts of a spousal will election than the "unitary"
approach of the reciprocal trust doctrine. Consider the case where W is
indifferent, or even antagonistic, toward C, H's child by a prior marriage, but
allows her property to pass under H's will because the life estate she receives in
H Trust is worth substantially more than the remainder she gives to C in her
trust. Clearly, the fragmented approach better explains what is happening here
than the unitary approach. In this case, W should be allowed, as under current
law, to offset the amount of her "gift" to C by the value of the life estate she
receives in H's property. Here, W's receipt of that life estate constitutes the real
"consideration" for her relinquishment of the remainder to C. Likewise, the value
of W's life estate in H Trust constitutes "consideration" for purposes of the
section 2043 offset. Again this result conforms to the existing law. However, the
adequacy of the consideration W received (Le., her life estate in H Trust) should
be measured against the value of the remainder she gives to C and not the value
of the property W places in W Trust in determining whether the exclusion from
section 2036 applies. To this limited extent, the holdings of the D'Ambrosio
trilogy should change the existing law in spousal elections.
The cases where the fragmented approach applies should be few in
number. Since the normal desire of every parent is to benefit her children, there
should be a strong presumption that the parent's decision to accede to the election
was partially motivated by the benefits it conferred on her children. Other
reasons for a strong presumption in favor of the unitary approach are the high
likelihood that the spousal election device will be used for tax avoidance; the
difficulty of determining the intent of deceased persons to transactions that may
have occurred many years before; and the fact that parties in an intrafamily
transactions rarely deal with each other on a conscious arm's length basis. The
same factors that led the Supreme Court to relieve the Government of the need
to prove a bargained-for, quid pro quo consideration before invoking the
reciprocal trust doctrine support a strong presumption here. 261
To invoke the fragmented approach, W's estate should be required to
show by clear and convincing evidence that W's decision to allow her property
to pass under H's will was not influenced by H's designation of C as the
remainderman. 262 Whenever courts are called on to determine subjective intent,

H's death (or the alternate valuation date), see IRC § 1014(b)(6), the deemed exchange of the

two shares should not produce any significant amount of taxable gain.
261. See supra text accompanying notes 237-39.
262. The suggested presumption is analogous to the rule applicable to divorce settlements that provide benefits to the payor's adult children. The IRS and the courts treat such
benefits as gifts by the payor spouse, unless he can prove otherwise. See Spruance v.
Commissioner, 60 T.C. 141 (1973); Rev. RuI. 77-314, 1977-2 C.B. 349.
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they necessarily place great weight on objective factors in judging the
genuineness of the party's alleged intent. 263 Here, two objective showings should
normally be required. First, lV's estate should be required to show that lV was
antagonistic, or at least indifferent, to the remaindermen designated in H's will.
This might be true, for example, where the remaindermen were H's children by
a prior marriage. Secondly, lV's estate should be required to show that W
possessed a reasonable basis for believing that her economic position would be
improved by allO\ving her property to pass under H's will. This showing could
be established by use of the Government actuarial tables or other convincing
valuation techniques.
An absolute rule eliminating the need to determine subjective intent cannot be applied in spousal elections. Unlike the situation in Grace, W's estate is
statutorily entitled to an estate tax offset or exclusion if it shows that W's receipt
of a life estate was the inducement for the relinquishment of the remainder in her
property. However, the above requirements should make use of this approach
administratively feasible as well as satisfying the requirements of the law.
c. Estate of Magnin, Spollsal Elections and the Reciprocal
Trust Doctrine.-AlthoughMagnin264 is not technically a spousal election case,
analytically it involved the same type ofexchange. Only the identity of the parties
differed: the exchange occurred between father and son rather than husband and
wife. Consequently, the Ninth's Circuit's decision to apply the D'AmbrosioWheeler test for "full consideration" to Magnin is strong precedent for extending
this test to spousal elections, and as such, the case deserves close scrutiny.
In Magnin, the combined stock holdings of decedent and his father
constituted voting control of a company operating women's clothing stores. 265
The father desired control of the business to remain "in the family" and
consequently did not want his son to leave his stock to any of the women he had

It is unclear whether the suggested presumption can be judicially developed or would
require legislative approval. Section 7491 provides generally that in any income. estate, or gift
tax controversy, the Commissioner has the burden of proof with respect to any factual issue on
which the taxpayer has introduced credible evidence. The Senate Finance Committee Report,
in explaining this provision, speaks of the prior "general rule of presumptive correctness of the
Commissioner's determination." S. Rep. No 174, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. 43 (1998). Arguably,
§ 7491 applies only to this general presumption, and not to judicially created presumptions
limited to special situations; however, the statute's language does contain such a limitation.
263. For example, under § 183 a taxpayer is entitled to deduct his ordinary and
necessary expenses if he engages in an activity with the intent of mnking a profit, even if his
expectation of a profit is unreasonable. However, the taxpayer's intent is determined by
reference to objective standards. See Regs. § 1.183-2(3).
264. Estate of Magnin v. Commissioner, 184 F.3d 1074 (9th Cir. 1999).
265. Estate of Magnin v. Commissioner, 71 T.C Memo (CCH) 1856, 1858, T.C.
Memo (RIA) lJ[ 96,025, at 239,241 (1996).
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started dating following his wife's death. 266 The decedent, on the other hand, was
concerned he might lose control of the company following his father's death,
which he valued for social, political and business reasons. 267
To accommodate these objectives, decedent and his father entered the
following agreement. The father agreed to leave his stock in four trusts, one for
the benefit of decedent and one for each of the decedent's three children. 268 Onehalf of the father's stock was to go to the decedent's trust in which the decedent
was to have a life income interest. 269 The father designated decedent as the sole
trustee of all four trusts with sole power to vote the stock thereby assuring the
son of continued control of the company. 270 In return, the son agreed to leave all
his stock in the company to his children upon his death. 271 The decedent was
enjoined from transferring or encumbering his shares but was permitted to give
them to his children. 272 Decedent agreed that if the company was dissolved, or all
its stock acquired, he would place the proceeds in a trust in which he would enjoy
a life income interest with the remainder passing to his children at death. 273
Following his father's death all the company's stock was bought by an
outside corporation, and decedent, in accordance with the agreement, placed the
proceeds from the sale of his stock in a trust having the terms described above. 274
When the decedent died, the IRS asserted that this trust was includible in his
gross estate under section 2036 since he had retained a life estate in it. 275 The
estate countered that the decedent had received full consideration for his transfer
of the remainder interest to his children, namely, voting control and a one-half
life income interest in his father's stock. 276
The court found there was "some" or "an element" of bargained-for
consideration in the transaction,zn but, following Gradow, found the
consideration decedent received inadequate since it did not equal the full value
of his stock he agreed to transfer to his children. 278 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit

266. See id.
267. See id.
268. See Magnin, 71 T.C. Memo (CCH) at 1859, T.C. Memo (RIA) at 241-42. The
father also agreed to leave to these trusts shares he owned in a separate corporation that
operated a women's clothing store in Reno, Nevada. See id.
269. See Magnin, 71 T.e. Memo (CCH) at 1858-59, T.C. Memo (RIA) at 243 (describing provisions of decedent's trust).
270. See Magnin, 71 T.C. Memo (CCH) at 1858-59, T.C. Memo (RIA) at 241-42.
271. See id.
272. See id.
273. See Magnin, 71 T.C. Memo (CCH) at 1859, T.C. Memo (RIA) at 243.
274. See id.
275. See Magnin, 71 T.C. Memo (CCH) at 1861, T.e. Memo (RIA) at 244-45.
276. See Magnin, 71 T.C. Memo (CCH) at 1861, T.C. Memo (RIA) at 245.
277. Magnin. 71 T.C. Memo (CCH) at 1862, T.C. Memo (RIA) at 246.
278. See Magnin, 71 T.C. Memo (CCH) at 1863, T.C. Memo (RIA) at 247.
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reversed and remanded, holding per D 'Ambrosio and Wheeler that the "full
consideration" requirement would be met if the estate could establish that the
consideration received (i.e., the one-half life income interest and voting control
in his father's stock) equaled or exceeded the present value of the remainder
interest decedent agreed to transfer to his children. 279 Note that if the estate
makes this showing, decedent and his estate will escape all transfer tax on
decedent's transfers to his children.
Both the Tax Court and the Circuit Court applied a "frngmented"
approach to the case. Unfortunately, neither court considered possible application
ofthe Lehman "unitary" approach. The fragmented approach views a transaction
like this exclusively in terms of an exchange of a remainder interest in one
party's property in return for a life interest in the other party's property. Each
party is viewed as indifferent to, and unaffected by, whatever other disposition
the other party makes of his property; thus the balance of his disposition is
viewed as irrelevant in determining the tax effects of the transaction. This
assumption of indifference is rarely true in a spousal election, and does not
appear to have been the case in Magnin.
Consider father's situation. Was his sale interest in the transaction to
protect his grandchildren? Was he indifferent, or even antagonistic, to his son's
continuing control of the business? The facts tell a different story. Even before
their agreement, the father had provided in his will for his stock to pass in trust
for the benefit of his son and his son's children; his son was also to serve as sale
trustee thereby assuring him of continuing control of the business.2&O The
agreement merely precluded him from revoking this provision; in other words, it
continued the status quO. 281 Was he opposed to having his son operate the
business? Although the father and son had different ideas as to how the business
should be operated, the father had turned operating control over to his son almost
15 years before their agreement. 282 It thus appears likely that the father-from
love, a sense of paternal obligation, or both-wanted his son to retain control of
the business provided the rights of his grandchildren were protected. Indeed, if
he opposed his son's continued control of the business and was solely motivated
by his grandchildren's welfare, he might better have achieved these objectives by
leaving his shares outright to his grandchildren.

279. Estate of Magnin v. Commissioner, 184 F.3d 1074 (9l1t Cir. 1999).
280. See Magnil/, 71 T.C. Memo (CCH) at 1859, T.C. Memo (RIA) at 242.
281. Seeid.
282. See MagI/in, 71 T.C. Memo (CCH) at 1857, T.C. Memo (RIA) at 240. The
fallter turned operation oflite business over to his son in 1937; lite agreement was made in 1951.
See id. After 1937, lite fallter concentrated his efforts on a successful factoring business he had
started. See id.
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Was the son's sole interest in the transaction to obtain voting control of
his father's shares? Was he indifferent, or even antagonistic, to his children
receiving his father's shares upon his death? There was no evidence of this.
Although the court made no finding to this effect, one might surmise some
tension existed between the decedent and his children since they disliked his
second wife. 283 But there is nothing to suggest that the son disliked his children,
or objected to their receiving his father's shares after the son's death. 284 On the
contrary, his children had worked with him in the business from early in their
lives and apparently continued to work with him in the business during the rest
of decedent's life.285 Decedent appointed his oldest son executor of his estate,
suggesting a relationship of trust and love. 286 Most likely, the decedent was
attracted to a solution where his father's shares would "remain in the family" and
ultimately pass to his children. Indeed, his agreement with his father benefited his
children by obligating his father to leave one-half of his shares in trusts for their
benefit.
These facts suggest the presence of both donative and bargaining
elements in the transaction. The Tax Court seems to have recognized this when
it found the transaction involved merely "some" bargained-for consideration, or
as it expressed the thought elsewhere, "an element of' bargained-for
consideration. 287
Since donative impulses were almost certainly present, the Lehman
"unitary" approach provides a better way of characterizing the transaction.
Father and son were bargaining. The father wanted a solution that would allow
his son to continue running the business but at the same time would protect his
grandchildren. The son wanted to assure his continued control of the business
but probably also wanted his children to have an interest in the business
following his death. The father proposed a package deal: "I will leave my shares
so that you can vote them during your lifetime and so they will pass to your
children upon your death. In return, you will continue to own your shares subject

283. See Magnin, 71 T.C. Memo (CCH) at 1858, T.C. Memo (RIA) at 240. The
father also disliked decedent's second wife. See id.
284. The decedent may have preferred to leave some or all of his own shares to his
second wife, at least for the period she survived him. As far as the opinion reveals, no evidence
was presented on how he wanted to leave his own shares. However, there is no reason to
suppose he was unhappy about his father's shares passing to his children after his (Le., the
son's) death. Indeed, as the text develops, the circumstances suggest he would have wanted his
children to have an interest in the business following his death.
285. See Magnin, 71 T.C. Memo (CCH) at 1858, T.C. Memo (RIA) at 240. The
opinion states that his children continued working in the business during their adulthood, except
that his daughter reduced her day-to-day activities following her marriage. Her husband entered
the business and was ultimately placed in charge of store operations. See id.
286. See Magnin, 71 T.C. Memo (CCH) at 1856, T.C. Memo (RIA) at 239.
287. Magnin, 71 T.C. Memo (CCH) at 1862, T.C. Memo (RIA) at 246.
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to some restrictions on their transfer but will leave them to your children on your
death." Each party's package was designed to appeal to the other and induce his
acceptance. Consequently, the father "bought and paid for" the son's disposition
of his shares and the son "bought and paid for" the father's disposition of his
shares. The decedent should therefore have been treated as the transferor of his
father's shares, and to the extent his father's disposition gave him a life income
interest, it should have been included in his gross estate pursuant to section
2036.288
Since the normal desire of every parent is to benefit his children, there
should be a strong presumption in these cases that the parent's decision to enter
the agreement was motivated, in part, by the benefits it conferred on his
offspring. Otherwise, the danger that such agreements will be used as cover for
making a tax-free, donative transfer to one's children is too great. In Magnin, the
estate fell far short of overcoming this presumption.

v. CONCLUSION
In a simple sale of a remainder, the actuarial value of such remainder
should be treated as "consideration" for gift and estate tax purposes. The
contrary position of the IRS and some courts is erroneous and should be
abandoned. Perhaps, this erroneous view was borne out ofconcern that taxpayers
could manipulate a transfer so that the actuarial value of a remainder would
understate its true economic worth. If so, the enactment of section 2702 removes
any possible justification for continued adherence to that position.
A spousal election should normally be analyzed under the "unitary
approach" of Lehman. Under this approach, H will be treated as establishing W
Trust and Was creating H Trust. Consequently, W will subject to a gift tax on
the full value of the remainder passing in H Trust to C and, unless W's retained
interest is a "qualified interest," on the full value of the property passing to that
trust. Since this approach views Was "retaining" a life estate in H Trust, the full
value of that trust \vill be included in her gross estate pursuant to section 2036.
Under this approach, neither W nor her estate \vill qualify for a section 2512(b)
gift tax offset or a section 2043 estate tax offset.

288. Since his father's disposition, which the Lellman analysis treats as having been
made by the decedent, gave the decedent a life estate in only one-halfofhis father's shares, only
that portion would be included in decedent's gross estate. His father's disposition gave the
decedent voting control of all his shares, but § 2036tb)-which treats a retention of voting
power in a controlled corporation as a retention of beneficial enjoyment-would not apply
because father's transfer occurred prior tolune 22, 1976. See Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L No.
95-600, § 702(i)(3), 92 Stat. 2763, 2931 (1978). The agreement was made in 1951 and the
father died in 1953. See Magnin, 71 T.C. Memo tCCH) at 1858-59, T.e. Memo (RIA) at 24142.
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However, the fragmented approach ofcurrent law should apply if Wand
her estate establish by clear and convincing evidence that W's decision to allow
her property to pass under H's will was uninfluenced by H's designation of C as
remainderman. Where this showing is made, W will be liable for a gift tax only
on the amount, if any, by which the value of the remainder she surrenders
exceeds the actuarial value of the life estate she receives in H Trust. W Trust
should be included in W's gross estate under section 2036 only if her life estate
in H Trust is worth less than the remainder in W Trust on the date of the election,
and even then, W's estate should be permitted to reduce W's gross estate by the
value of the life estate on the day of election.
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